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SOLVING THE INFORMATION SECURITY & PRIVACY 
CRISIS BY EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF TOP 
MANAGEMENT PERSONAL LIABILITY 
Charles Cresson Wood† 
ABSTRACT 
While information security and privacy losses are now spiraling out of control, 
and have been demonstrably shown to threaten national sovereignty, military 
superiority, industrial infrastructure order, national economic competitiveness, the 
solvency of major businesses, faith and trust in the Internet as a platform for 
modern commerce, as well as political stability, the U.S. Congress has nonetheless 
to date refused to seriously address the root cause of these threats. The root cause is 
a legally reinforced incentive system that encourages, and further entrenches, top 
management decisions that provide inadequate resources for, and inadequate top 
management attention to, information security and privacy matters. This article 
explains why the current top management legally defined incentive systems are 
dysfunctional and how they should be modified so as to create considerably more 
socially desirable results. Employing a minimum-changes politically palatable 
strategy, the article discusses how a revival of the common law theories of 
negligence and recklessness, in both the criminal and civil areas, can be used to 
establish a new socially beneficial top management incentive system. A draft 
federal statute manifesting these recommendations is provided. 
INTRODUCTION 
The information security and privacy crisis that the world now faces is so 
shocking, so damaging, and so pervasive, that it seems impossible to resolve. But 
this viewpoint, which is widely disseminated in the mass media, is, in fact, 
reasonable only when the root cause of the crisis is not understood. In reality, the 
crisis is repeatedly being entrenched, perpetuated, and worsened by top 
management incentive systems that strongly discourage top managers from giving 
this area the attention it must have, and from making the investment that this area 
requires. In other words, the current legally defined top management incentive 
system keeps us in a vicious circle that perpetuates the status quo, which is clearly 
not working. 
While top management’s fiduciary obligations to the organization where they 
work do promote decisions for the benefit of the organization and its primary 
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constituencies such as shareholders, donors, and taxpayers, the legally recognized 
duty of care to which top management must comply does not promote top 
management’s observation of duties to third parties such as current customers, ex-
employees, and existing business partners. For example, the typical current top 
management incentive systems encourage secrecy, conflicts of interest, short-term 
decisions, excessive risk taking, and grossly inadequate investment in the 
infrastructure needed to achieve adequate levels of information security and 
privacy. 
The world has changed dramatically, thanks to powerful new technologies like 
the Internet and mobile computing, and citizens of industrialized nations are now 
much more connected. The law needs to reflect this interconnectedness by using a 
consistent and standardized nation-wide approach (and later a world-wide 
approach). 
Recognizing that top managers, at least in the information security and privacy 
area, have become stewards of the public trust, the ones to make decisions that 
materially affect third parties, this article proposes that we push the reset button in 
the law. It suggests that we revert to time-tested and proven traditional tort concepts 
of negligence and recklessness (both civil and criminal). Relevant defenses, notably 
the business judgment rule, the assumption of the risk defense, the contributory 
negligence defense, and the license defense, are also in need of material change to 
acknowledge the new reality which requires a more socially responsible standard of 
conduct to which top management must legally adhere. 
Using a new model law as a reference point, the author suggests that with a 
minimum number of conservative changes to existing laws, the U.S. Congress can 
establish a new and truly motivating level of top management personal liability for 
information security and privacy harms done to third parties. With such a federal 
law, the Congress could thereby rapidly bring about considerably more socially 
desirable results, including enhanced trust in the economic and technological 
infrastructure, and a marked reduction in the level of losses currently sustained. 
I. TOP MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE SYSTEMS ARE A CRITICAL DETERMINANT OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY & PRIVACY LOSSES 
Reeling from widespread criticism that it has coddled Wall Street criminal bank 
executives,1 demonstrated by the fact that not a single indictment of an executive 
has been handed down since the disastrous financial crisis of 2007-2008, the U.S. 
Justice Department has recently issued new policies that prioritize the prosecution 
of individual employees, not just the companies where they work.2 While major 
 
 1.  David Michaels, 2015 Spurred Billions in Bank Fines, But Not Enough for Warren, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESS (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-29/2015-spurred-billions-in-
bank-fines-but-not-enough-for-warren (discussing recent Wall Street fraud prosecutions in which no 
individual bank executives were prosecuted by the government). 
 2.  Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street Executives, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/us/politics/new-justice-dept-rules-aimed-at-prosecuting-
corporate-executives.html?emc=eta1&_r=0. This policy represents an acknowledgement by the federal 
government that the current top management incentive system is in need of adjustment, the same topic that 
this article addresses. 
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fines related to that financial crisis have been levied against involved corporations, 
there is a serious danger that these fines will simply be viewed as a routine cost of 
doing business, and so the current dangerous, risk-seeking behavior will not 
change. To avoid continuing, serious, and socially detrimental results, the legal 
incentive systems surrounding executive responsibility urgently needs to be 
realigned so as to reflect greater executive personal responsibility for decisions that 
affect third parties.3 This is true in the financial sector, as evidenced in the 
propensity to take on excessive debt, and it is true in the domain of information 
security and privacy, as evidenced by many dramatic recent headlines.4 
Corporations do not commit crimes, do not have a mind that could generate 
malicious intent, do not act negligently, and do not, in and of themselves, cause 
material losses to others. Corporations are simply an organizational form through 
which people act; they are not a culpable party. Fines levied against corporations 
alone will therefore not have significant motivational effects. But rather than 
pinning responsibility on specific executives, the U.S. justice system typically 
shields top management using traditional agency law theories and the business 
judgment rule. To compel top management to pay more attention to the pressing 
information security and privacy crisis that the nation now faces, and to force top 
managers to allocate sufficient resources to adequately and responsibly deal with 
this serious problem, a realignment in the U.S. legal incentive system is now 
required. That sought-after incentive system realignment can be achieved by: (1) 
updating the laws of negligence and recklessness to enable and facilitate lawsuits 
brought by third parties who have been seriously harmed by personally-responsible 
top management, (2) recognizing a type of white-collar managerial crime in the 
law, a genre of criminal negligence or recklessness, which acknowledges that, when 
it comes to information security and privacy, corporate top managers are now 
important stewards of the public trust, and (3) limiting the use of certain defenses, 
such as the business judgment rule and the assumption of risk, that would prevent 
charges of negligence and recklessness from being illegitimately blocked in court 
proceedings by defense counsel. 
This article will explore the nature of the current information security and 
privacy crisis and note some aggravating forces that will continue to cause the crisis 
to get worse—that is, unless these forces are reversed by changes in incentive-
system-related law, such as those described herein. The article will additionally 
explore who actually makes decisions about information security and privacy in 
organizations, and the primary incentive systems now causing these parties to act in 
ways that are seriously dysfunctional. After a brief history of top management 
 
 3.  Public opinion is in support of such a change in the law, and top-level business leaders agree. A 
study done by the New York Stock Exchange Governance Services, noted that nine out of ten board of 
director member respondents believed that businesses should be held liable if they do not abide by the 
standard of due care. See NYSE & Veracode, Cybersecurity and Corporate Liability: The Board’s View, 
VERACODE 2 (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.veracode.com/nyse-and-veracode-survey-reveals-cyber-related-
corporate-liability-is-top-of-mind-for-boards-and-executive. 
 4.  The appropriate level of executive personal liability for harms caused to third parties is certainly not 
a conversation unique to the United States. For example, there has been increasing liberalization of the rules 
allowing shareholder derivative suits against top management in Japan since the 1990s. See Carl F. Goodman, 
The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant: Japan’s Changing View Toward Civil Litigation, 32 L. & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS. 769, 799 n.131 (2001). 
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personal liability for information security and privacy harms caused to third parties, 
the article goes on to define a new “standard of care,”5 a readily achievable standard 
to which top management should conform in order to avoid personal civil liability 
and/or criminal culpability. 
The specific changes to agency law and the business judgment rule that are 
necessary to successfully bring about this change in incentives are also covered. To 
clarify exactly what is required and simplify the determination of whether a tort or a 
crime has taken place, the article will also suggest a safe harbor provision that will 
allow top management to readily determine whether they are on the right side of the 
law. Thus, top management decision-related operational simplicity, low cost to 
implement, low cost to determine potential liability, and low cost to adjudicate/
settle, have been significant objectives in the drafting of the model law found in the 
appendix to this article. 
While other aspects of the law of executive responsibility and accountability 
related to information security and privacy clearly need to be changed,6 this article 
focuses only on executive responsibility and accountability because that area is so 
key to remediating the pressing crisis we now face.7 Using conservative and modest 
changes and realignments to traditional and well-established concepts of the law 
related to liability and personal responsibility, this article proposes a relatively 
inexpensive, relatively easy to implement, and relatively minor set of adjustments 
to the law that are likely to have a significant and long-lasting effect in terms of: (1) 
preserving the integrity and resilience of both information systems and societal 
infrastructure managed by information systems, (2) maintaining and enhancing 
national competitiveness, and (3) protecting and enhancing national security. Trust 
is an essential factor that must be present if a populace will allow the government to 
govern them. It must additionally be present if a customer is to engage in a sale 
with an online business. Trust in both our current legal system and our current 
 
 5.  The common law surrounding negligence for information security and privacy matters is already 
tending in the direction proposed in this article, although it needs to be advanced and clarified, for example, 
through the statute proposed in the appendix. Consider Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics and Gynecology, 
102 A.3d 32 (Conn. 2014), which involved the Connecticut Supreme Court recognizing that the controls 
found in regulations implementing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) 
constitute a standard of due care that could be referenced for purposes of determining negligence. 
 6.  Certainly, other significant changes are needed in addition to a shift in the legal definition of 
executive personal responsibility. For example, the U.S. Justice Department must stop using deferred 
prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) and non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”) to prevent corporations from 
running the risk that, after a criminal conviction, they will be branded as criminals and then suffer a major 
erosion in their reputation. See Russell Mokhiber, Twenty Things You Should Know About Corporate Crime, 
25 CORP. CRIME REP. 25 (2007). Another major change that is needed is that vendors that sell information 
security and privacy products that are clearly insufficiently secured need to be held strictly liable for the 
damage that their products cause. See Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has 
the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425 (2008); David Sirota, Prosecution of White Collar Crime Hits 
20-Year Low, ALTERNET (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.alternet.org/news-amp-politics/prosecution-white-
collar-crime-hits-20-year-low. 
 7.  Increased top management personal liability as discussed in this article is fully consistent with 
provision 404(b) found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. That provision requires top management to assess 
and attest to the financial control measures used to prepare the financial statements for public companies. The 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) believes that the law has led to improved 
financial reporting and greater transparency. This article seeks to move in that same general direction, but in 
the domain of information security and privacy. See Section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, AM. INST. 
OF CPAS, http://www.aicpa.org/Advocacy/Issues/Pages/Section404bofSOX.aspx. 
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technological structure is now in serious jeopardy and urgently needs to be 
bolstered and augmented. The proposed law in this article attempts to serve that 
objective of enhancing trust as well. 
The law of unintended consequences8 holds that “the actions of people, 
particularly the actions of the government, always have effects and consequences 
that are unanticipated.”9 Although politicians often ignore that law, this author has 
consistently borne it in mind, and employed great caution when preparing the 
limited changes in the law described below. This article does not so much advocate 
a new approach, as it suggests that various traditional tried-and-true legal 
approaches, approaches that have been demonstrably workable in the traditional 
system of common law, can be combined in a different way to achieve socially 
desirable results, notably achievement of an adequate level of information security 
and privacy. Accordingly, the limited-scope and most-conservative recommended 
changes in the law described in this article are fundamentally (a) explicit definitions 
of matters that remain vague in the law, (b) new applications of existing common 
law and statutes, and (c) limitations of the defenses provided by existing laws. 
II. COMPELLING EVIDENCE NOW SHOWS THAT WE ARE IN AN INFORMATION 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY CRISIS 
That America is in serious trouble can firstly be shown by the April 2015 
breach of computers at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management.10 That security 
breach resulted in personally identifiable information such as names, Social 
Security numbers, dates of birth, and addresses, being released for millions of 
people who had undergone military and government agency background checks. 
Not only does the breach pose a short-term risk of identity theft, but it will 
jeopardize U.S. undercover operations for a generation since those involved will be 
subject to blackmail, unexpected disclosure of their identities, etc. That one attack 
changes the balance of power between countries, alters the battlefield of 
international conflicts, and jeopardizes American competitiveness. That attack also 
points to the fact that computers and networks are the modern nervous system of 
our society, and they must be vigorously and effectively protected, if our now 
highly automated society is going to survive. 
That the nation is now in a serious information security and privacy crisis can 
secondly be illustrated by the Sony Pictures Entertainment attack that took place on 
November, 24, 2014.11 As a result of that attack, a major corporation lost the use of 
 
 8.  Although certainly much older in its origins, this law was popularized by sociologist Robert K. 
Merton. See Michael T. Kaufman &Robert K. Merton, Versatile Sociologist and Father of the Focus Group, 
Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/24/nyregion/robert-k-merton-
versatile-sociologist-and-father-of-the-focus-group-dies-at-92.html. 
 9.  Rob Norton, Unintended Consequences, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY (2002), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html. 
 10.  David E. Sanger & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking Linked to China Exposes Millions of U.S. 
Workers, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/us/breach-in-a-federal-computer-
system-exposes-personnel-data.html. 
 11.  Lori Grisham, Timeline: North Korea and the Sony Pictures Hack, USA TODAY (Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/12/18/sony-hack-timeline-interview-north-
korea/20601645. 
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over 3,000 computers and 800 servers. All connections to the Internet were shut off, 
including connections to other Sony units and third parties. The corporation was 
plunged into a pre-digital age of landline telephone and hand-delivered messages 
written via pen and paper. Not long after that, President Barack Obama declared a 
national emergency12 and issued an executive order to deal with the “increasing 
prevalence and severity of malicious cyber-enabled activities originating from, or 
directed by persons located, in whole or in part, outside the United States.” 
In other words, the game has recently changed and nation states are now 
actively engaged in cyber-warfare, and both corporations and government agencies 
are at significant risk. While those seeking to make political points (“hacktivists”), 
those seeking to show their intellectual prowess (“hackers”), as well as those 
seeking to “make a buck” from crimes such as identity theft (“ghosts”), are 
certainly still serious concerns, the attackers now include agents from well-financed 
nation states and operatives from sophisticated organized crime gangs.13 
While there is unquestionably a wide variety of very powerful and versatile 
new security and privacy technology available, the fundamental issue behind 
information security and privacy problems that we now experience involves 
people.14 Technology alone is not going to solve information security and privacy 
problems. Instead, management must devote additional attention to the risks that 
new information systems like the Internet introduce, and they must also allocate 
sufficient resources so that these same security and privacy problems can be 
adequately addressed. Top management now stands as the gatekeeper, holding the 
purse strings of organizations, and it is often blocking the work on information 
security and privacy that must be undertaken in order to adequately protect 
information systems, as well as the assets, both physical and intellectual, that these 
information systems control. Unfortunately, the prevailing incentive systems, such 
as quarterly bonuses paid for high profits, encourage top management to act in a 
penny-pinching manner, denying these essential activities both the top management 
attention and the resources that these areas must now receive.15 
III. CURRENT INCENTIVE SYSTEMS CAUSE TOP MANAGEMENT TO INADEQUATELY 
ADDRESS INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
A. Top Management Does Not Personally Pay the Price for Insufficient 
Information Security & Privacy 
Like all people in America today, top managers are operating in the midst of a 
 
 12.  Exec. Order No. 13694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18077, 18077 (Jan. 6, 2015). Reflecting the serious problems 
in this area, one should note that President Obama has issued a total of five Executive Orders and Presidential 
Directives that authorize offensive and defensive actions in cyberspace. See Catherine A. Theohary & Anne I. 
Harrington, Cyber Operations in DOD Policy and Plans: Issues for Congress, 22 CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, (Jan. 5, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43848.pdf. 
 13.  Jeremy Bergsman, Do You Care Who’s Attacking Your Firm?, CEB BLOGS (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.cebglobal.com/blogs/information-security-do-you-care-whos-attacking-your-firm. 
 14.  See Donn B. Parker, People Are the Number One Problem for Computer Security: Some Suggestions 
for Control, 2 COMPUTER CRIME DIG. 5, 5-10 (1984). 
 15.  Gary Loveland & Mark Lobel, Cybersecurity: The New Business Priority, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/view/issue-15/cybersecurity-business-priority.html. 
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complex modern social system, and are thus subject to influence from a variety of 
objectives, incentives, and constraints.16 Beyond their own personal objectives and 
personalities, the behavior of top management can be predicted to be a function of 
those same objectives, incentives, and constraints. For example, if (thanks to 
limited corporate liability laws) top management at a high-tech venture-capital-
funded firm is playing with other people’s money, and their own net worth will not 
be adversely impacted if a serious security or privacy problem were to occur, top 
management will be encouraged to take on an excessive level of risk in the hope 
that they might hit it big with the new firm.17 So if the budget allocation for 
information security and privacy is insufficient, and a serious loss does later result, 
top management does not generally personally pay the price.18 The price is instead 
paid by the organization, and/or third parties such as suppliers and in some 
instances, investors, customers, and the general public. Since top managers 
personally enjoy the benefits of a restricted budget for information security and 
privacy, via higher quarterly bonuses,19 more promotions, etc., and because top 
management can spread the costs across third parties (economists call the effects of 
this spreading “externalities”20), top management is now economically encouraged 
to keep information security and privacy budgets dangerously low.21 
 
 
 16.  PAULINE BOWEN ET AL., INFORMATION SECURITY HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR MANAGERS (Nat’l Inst. 
of Standards and Tech.) (2006). 
 17.  Top managers know more about risks facing the organization than investors or other parties, and this 
asymmetry of knowledge encourages top managers to take on excessive risks. This problem has been widely 
studied. See Peter M. DeMarzo et al., Risking Other People’s Money: Gambling, Limited Liability, and 
Optimal Incentives, Working Paper No. 3149, STANFORD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS (2014), available 
at https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/risking-other-peoples-money-gambling-
limited-liability-optimal. 
 18.  As one illustrative recent case, consider the massive release of credit card numbers that Target 
experienced on December 19, 2013. See Brian Krebs, The Target Breach, by the Numbers, KREBS ON 
SECURITY (May 14, 2014), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/05/the-target-breach-by-the-numbers. Some 70 
million credit card numbers were stolen, and those cardholders had an unknown amount of expenses 
associated with changing cards, at the very least. Id. The banks that issued the credit cards paid an estimated 
$200 million to reissue the credit cards. Id. Target itself will be spending $100 million to upgrade its point of 
sale terminals to support the new Chip-and-PIN technology. Id. Target also paid a $10 million settlement for a 
class action lawsuit brought by customers, and a $67 million settlement to Visa and its card issuers. Id. Target 
laid off 1,700 employees because sales were down as a result of the breach. Id. The CEO stepped down from 
his position, but he stands to reap $55 million from an executive compensation golden parachute package. Id. 
A shareholder derivative suit was filed in the District of Minnesota on January 29, 2014, named Collier v. 
Steinhafel et al., No. 14-cv-266 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2014), but according to this author’s analysis of PACER 
records, which was performed on February 8, 2016, there have been no notable developments since. 
 19.  Alfred Rappaport, Executive Incentives vs. Corporate Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., (July-Aug. 1978), 
available at https://hbr.org/1978/07/executive-incentives-vs-corporate-growth. In this classic article, 
Rappaport describes how incentive systems focused on short-term earnings encourage short-term thinking by 
top management. Id. 
 20.  For a discussion of the perverse behind-the-scenes effects associated with inadequate investment 
levels in information security, including externalities, see Ross Anderson, Why Information Security Is 
Hard—An Economic Perspective, 358 (2001) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.acsac.org/2001/papers/110.pdf. 
 21.  See SYDNEY FINKELSTEIN ET AL., STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: THEORY AND RESEARCH ON 
EXECUTIVES: TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS, AND BOARDS 336 (2009) (discussing how top management adjusts 
strategic behavior to manipulate measures of their performance). 
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B. Information Security and Privacy Requires Exceedingly Complex Long-
Term Investment in Control Systems 
At the same time, computer systems and networks are some of the most 
complex things that humans have ever created. To manage them adequately, 
notably to keep them properly secure and private, top management must establish 
and maintain exceedingly complex control systems. The development and use of 
these control systems requires a long-term effort that requires an incredible amount 
of both management attention and resources. The computer systems and networks 
that our society is now so dependent upon are the result of decades of compounded 
growth, where the older technologies have been augmented by newer technologies. 
As a result of this adding-on process, various problems are introduced, including 
gaps in knowledge, lapses in controls, inconsistencies, irregularities, and 
incompatibilities, and these problems in turn have often led to security and privacy 
losses. The many layers of inconsistent technological systems that now exist are 
revealed by the plugs and jacks used to connect various types of computers and 
mobile computing devices. In this environment, even a layperson can get a sense 
for the irregularity, non-standardization, inconsistency, and lack of coherence in 
many information systems today. 
Since top management is now rewarded primarily based upon short-term 
financial performance, they have a disincentive against investing in the long-term 
control systems necessary to bring coherence, consistency, organization, security, 
and privacy to these information systems.22 As a consequence, top management 
helps to create long-term information security and privacy risks of immense 
proportion that only get more dangerous, pervasive, and more systemic as time goes 
on. In order to stop these risks from growing still more disastrous and pervasive, a 
change in the legal system that recognizes top management personal liability for 
harms done to third parties is now required. 
C. Stock Options Create Short-Term Focus Incompatible with Investment in 
Long-Term Technology Infrastructure 
The pervasive use of stock options, as a part of a typical private sector top 
management compensation package, creates many of the same dysfunctional results 
as bonuses based on quarterly financial results. The ensuing focus on stock price 
brings a short-term viewpoint that encourages short-term thinking, and short-term 
strategies. This focus will hopefully hold up at least until the top level manager 
instituting them has retired, has taken a job at another organization, or has died. 
Since information security and privacy requires a significant dedicated long-term 
investment in order to be done successfully, to the extent that chief executives are 
 
 22.  Since complexity management is a significant causal factor behind a wide variety of information 
security and privacy problems (such as errors in setting-up access control permissions), top management must 
take the time, and invest the resources, to deal with complexity management issues if they are going to 
adequately address information security and privacy. See Mark Mitchell, Reducing Complexity, Ensuring 
Security: Toward Better Information Management, Government Executive (Aug. 20, 2014), 
http://www.govexec.com/insights/reports/reducing-complexity-ensuring-security-toward-better-information-
management/91952. 
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paid with stock options, this arrangement further supports their focus on short-term 
financial results,23 which can and often does have dysfunctional impacts on the 
necessary long-term investment in technological infrastructure, such as in 
information security and privacy.24 
Options are inherently speculative. When an organization bases a large part of a 
top manager’s pay on a speculative matter, the organization should not be surprised 
that the top manager is taking a high-risk bet. Top managers should be required to 
hold options for a long period of time, such as a decade or two, so as to foster long-
term investment in the organization where they work.25 Indeed, a statistical analysis 
of technology companies reveals that a longer vesting period for executive stock 
options is correlated with higher growth rates for the involved business.26 
A study done at Harvard Business School revealed that stock options 
encouraged top managers to engage in earnings manipulation, including the 
reporting of higher discretionary current accruals, larger excess fourth quarter sales, 
and a greater likelihood of future lawsuits at their firms.27 So then what incentive 
system is, in fact, acting as a counterweight, to block top management 
misrepresentations about the numbers in order to hit a financial target, and to block 
top management from taking on excessive risk? Certainly being fired or obtaining a 
bad reputation in the industry are considerations. But this author, after studying the 
net effects, suggests such counter-incentives are insufficient. Instead, if top 
management was seriously worried about being sued personally for negligence or 
recklessness, that should help establish a proper balance. Under the current legal 
system, however, such a lawsuit rarely occurs. 
D. High Straight Level Salaries Reveal Insensitivity to Organization 
Reputation Problems & Other Related Issues 
Top managers are also in many cases paid straight salaries, albeit with very 
high dollar amounts, as if they were top government bureaucrats.28 The insensitivity 
of their pay to public reputation problems, such as those caused by a major 
information security or privacy breach, is a further incentive to pay less than the 
necessary level of attention to investment in long-term infrastructure needed to 
achieve adequate levels of information security and privacy. 
 
 23.  Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay But How, 
HARV. BUS. REV. 138, 140 (May-June 1990), available at https://hbr.org/1990/05/ceo-incentives-its-not-how-
much-you-pay-but-how. 
 24.  For a discussion of the perverse impact of externalities on the level of information security 
infrastructure investment, see Lawrence A. Gordon & Martin P. Loeb, The Economics of Information Security 
Investment, 5 TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. AND SYS. SECURITY, 438, 453 (2002); Johannes M. Bauer and Michel 
J. G. van Eeten, Cybersecurity: Stakeholder Incentives, Externalities, and Policy Options, 33 TELECOMM. 
POL’Y 706 (2009), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2009.09.001. 
 25.  See Charles M. Elson, What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?, HARV. BUS. REV. Jan. 2003, at 
68, 69, https://hbr.org/2003/01/whats-wrong-with-executive-compensation. 
 26.  Maxwell J. Chambers, The Effect of Executive Compensation on Firm Performance through the Dot-
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The trustworthiness of a firm, and the infrastructure that it has built and uses, is 
a critical component of not only organizational success, but also organizational 
viability going forward in time.29 When a debacle like the Sony hack (mentioned 
above) takes place, top management generally does not personally pay the price. 
The corporation is generally thought to be the entity that bears the risk, not 
members of top management personally. This arrangement, characterized by 
insensitivity of top management rewards to relevant external conditions, in turn 
creates incentives for top management to act recklessly.30 Insufficient investment in 
the technological infrastructure supporting information security and privacy is just 
one of the casualties of this reckless behavior. 
E. Secrecy Encourages Maintenance of the Status Quo, Even Though 
Information Systems Technology is Changing the World Dramatically 
The exact nature of the employment contract that a top manager has with a 
commercial firm is generally confidential. The employer wishes to keep such an 
agreement secret lest it fall into the hands of competitors, and then allow 
competitors to more easily lure away the involved top manager. The top manager 
wishes to keep such an agreement secret because revealing it publicly would 
probably upset other employees of the same organization who did not get such a 
lucrative deal.31 In addition, at a particular commercial entity, the executive 
compensation system and the executive incentive system are likely to be considered 
proprietary and confidential information, which, in turn, is declared to be restricted 
information in these employment contracts.32 
Of course, if these employment agreements are not disclosed to other firms or 
other employees, they probably are not disclosed to shareholders, customers, 
unions, or the general public. This lack of transparency prevents these agreements 
from being challenged because they have embedded conflicts of interest.33 This 
lack of transparency also interferes with the duty of shareholders to properly 
supervise the top managers at the firm in question via the Board of Directors, 
derivative suits, shareholder activism, and the like. The fact that access to top 
management compensation related information is a significant issue at all reveals 
that the existing top management incentive systems are suspect, at the very least.34 
 
 29.  See generally Marjory S. Blumenthal, The Politics and Policies of Enhancing Trustworthiness for 
Information Systems, 4 COMM. L. & POL’Y 513 (1999). 
 30.  Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215, 
1215-16 (2003). 
 31.  The current ratio of unskilled worker pay to chief executive pay in the U.S. is now 350:1. Gretchen 
Gavett, CEOs Get Paid Too Much, According to Pretty Much Everyone in the World, HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG 
NETWORK (Sept. 23, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/09/ceos-get-paid-too-much-according-to-pretty-much-
everyone-in-the-world. 
 32.  Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC”) investor proxy disclosure rules require some executive 
compensation disclosures, in part to counteract the secrecy that otherwise would surround this information. 
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 8 (2014). 
 33.  There is, however, an increased call to make such compensation packages with top managers public. 
See Yonca Ertimur et al., Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, REV. OF FIN. STUD. (Nov. 19, 2010), available 
at http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2010/11/18/rfs.hhq113.full.pdf+html. 
 34.  Jeremy L. Goldstein & Jeremey L. Goldstein & Associates, LLC, Shareholder Activism and 
Executive Compensation, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL 
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Ideally, as a matter of integrity of the structure of the legal and social systems under 
which we operate, and as a way to foster greater public trust, all such executive 
compensation arrangements should be made public, and left open to both challenge 
and periodic revision based on alleged conflicts of interest. 
F. Focus on Career Advancement and Personal Fame Leaves Long-Term 
Investment in Infrastructure in the Dust 
One additional employment-market-oriented incentive system that motivates 
top management is the chance to significantly advance one’s career by taking a 
higher-paying or more prestigious position with another organization. In past 
decades, many top managers would have been with their company for their entire 
working careers. Today, frequent job changes are the norm,35 and along with that 
higher job change frequency goes the focus on short-term thinking, short-term 
financial results, and, not surprisingly, an undue acceptance of short-term risks in 
the information security and privacy areas. 
IV. A SHORT HISTORY OF TOP MANAGEMENT PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR 
INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY HARMS TO THIRD PARTIES 
Limited liability (in the context of business rather than sovereign immunity, 
diplomatic immunity, parliamentary immunity, judicial immunity, or prosecutorial 
immunity) was first created in 1844 English law via the corporate form—a separate 
legal personality. This limited liability was intended to enable endeavors that might 
not otherwise be possible, such as the financing of a large project like building a 
network of canals.36 The legal personality separation of the corporation from the 
legal personality of individual decision makers, investors, business partners, 
employees, lenders, and other parties has been and continues to be a hallmark of the 
corporate organizational structure. As a derivative of English law, the limited 
liability structure of the modern American corporation combines, and, in multiple 
ways conflates, the limited liability of investors with limited liability of top decision 
makers. On a conceptual level, this article claims that superior social welfare results 
will be obtained if these two types of limited liability are dealt with in a more 
distinctly separate manner in the law. 
In terms of losses caused to third parties resulting from corporate activity, there 
is convincing economic justification for having corporations bear the risk for 
unintentional harms in order to encourage both entrepreneurial risk taking and an 
expanded level of economic activity. But that same justification is not relevant to 
knowing and intentional harms caused by actions taken by top management. In 
support of this claim of inapplicability is ample evidence for the “deflection 
 
REGULATION (June 18, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/18/shareholder-activism-and-
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 35.  Richard Mills, Hiring Leaders: A Failsafe Guide to Dominating Any Industry by Employing its 
Dominant People, CHALRE ASSOCIATES (2013), http://www.chalre.com/pdfs/Hiring_Leaders.pdf. 
 36.  Paddy Ireland, Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the Problem of Corporate Irresponsibility, 
34 CAMBRIDGE J. OF ECON. 837, 839 (2010), available at 
http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/content/34/5/837.full.pdf+html. 
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hypothesis” by which top management of corporations has the involved corporation 
bear a disproportional amount of the risk of knowing and intentional misdeeds for 
which they are responsible.37 For example, empirical research shows that when 
increased directors’ and officers’ insurance shields top management from personal 
liability related to mergers and acquisitions, the results are detrimental to 
shareholder returns.38 
If corporations are not able to shift some of this risk bearing for intentional and 
knowing acts back to top management personally, then socially undesirable results 
are likely to ensue.39 For purposes of the following discussion about information 
security and privacy related harms caused to third parties, it is critical that we as a 
society come to appreciate that inadequate investment in information security and 
privacy be clearly seen as an intentional and knowing act, an act for which top 
management should be held personally liable. 
At the current time, insufficient top management investment in information 
security is a vague and often inadequately explored area when it comes to assigning 
liability for the harms caused to third parties. As will be explained further below, it 
is now possible to clearly delineate what is an adequate level of investment in 
information security and privacy, and thus a court can now readily determine 
whether there has been such an intentional and knowing act on top management’s 
part. Top management personal liability is thus suggested as an appropriate penalty 
when intentional and knowingly inadequate investment in information security and 
privacy takes place. 
Sanctions imposed on corporations will typically be increased when top 
management is shown to have been involved through intentional and knowing acts, 
for example via the “alter ego theory,” whereby top management uses the 
corporation as its own alter ego to pursue personal purposes.40 Sanctions will also 
typically be increased if top management can be shown to have directed certain 
misdeeds, as can be found in the organizational sentencing guidelines found in the 
Model Penal Code.41 Of particular concern are those cases where top management 
takes the corporation down a knowing or reckless path, leading to significant 
damage to third parties, not just investors, but also customers, prospective 
customers, business partners, and members of the general public. Recent examples 
of such knowing or reckless behavior have included firms like Enron, Worldcom, 
and Global Crossing. 
Corporate officers have a variety of duties to their company and to 
shareholders, including the duty of care, the duty of good faith, the duty of loyalty, 
the duty of disclosure, the duty of oversight, the duty not to violate the law, and the 
 
 37.  Khanna, supra note 30, at 1254. 
 38.  Chen Lin et al., Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Acquisition Outcomes, 102 J. OF 
FIN. ECON. 507, 507-525 (2011), available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X1100184X. 
 39.  Khanna, supra note 30, at 1218. 
 40.  For example, the court may pierce the corporate veil and thus hold the owner personally liable, if 
that the corporate form is a sham (there was actual fraud) and that the corporation was simply acting on behalf 
of the owner. See Latham v. Burgher, 320 S.W.3d 602, 609 (Tex. App. 2010). 
 41.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2016); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1985). 
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duty of reasonable reliance and delegation.42 Corporate officers may face personal 
liability if they breach these fiduciary duties, but the standard is quite high, as 
evidenced by the Caremark decision.43 In general, only the most egregious cases 
result in either director or officer personal liability. The types of lawsuits now 
possible for the breach of these duties are either direct or derivate suits and are 
brought by shareholders or, in some cases, by creditors. There are generally no 
legally recognized duties of corporate officers to third parties. As discussed later in 
this article, in addition to other affirmative defenses, there is most prominently the 
business judgment rule, which generally protects both directors and officers against 
personal liability. 
In the information security and privacy area, there are also several federal 
statutes that impose responsibility on corporate officers. These include the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the Healthcare Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act. The Federal Trade Commission recently has 
been quite active in the information security and privacy area acting under authority 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,44 but the penalties imposed are typically against 
the involved organization rather than the top managers at that organization.45 State 
laws, such as those that dictate how to notify victims of a security breach, may 
additionally impose some personal liability on top managers.46 In America, 
however, there is currently no consistent legal theory or policy regarding top 
management personal liability for harms caused to third parties.47 This article 
suggests the establishment of such a unified legal framework via federal legislation. 
To more effectively motivate top management to act in a socially beneficial 
manner, specifically to invest adequate resources in information security and 
privacy, the law must consistently hold top management personally liable for harms 
caused to third parties that ensue from inadequate information security and privacy 
investment decisions.48 
V. SUGGESTED WORKING OBJECTIVES THAT WOULD BETTER INCENTIVIZE TOP 
MANAGEMENT 
Turning to the future, and thinking about how the current legal situation could 
be improved, without delving deeply into the literature of employee incentive 
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system design, we can generally posit ten desirable attributes for an incentive 
system.49 These ten general attributes for a successful incentive system are: 
(1) Explicitly stated objective criteria that are easily measurable and ideally 
quantitative, 
(2) Criteria based on feedback coming from disinterested sources such as non-
conflicted third parties or other sources that are not subject to manipulation (low 
distortion potential), 
(3) Criteria reflective of a significant range of behaviors over which the 
measured employee has control so as to directly affect the results, 
(4) Criteria perceived as significantly impactful on employee rewards and/or 
penalties,50 
(5) Criteria consistent with other motivational forces such as promotions and 
the threat of termination, 
(6) Criteria unlikely to be distorted by factors uncontrollable by the employee, 
(7) Criteria unlikely to produce employee behaviors that are problematic or 
dysfunctional to the organization, 
(8) Criteria consistent with the employer’s strategic values and priorities, 
(9) Criteria reliant on skills and knowledge possessed by, or readily acquired 
by, the employee, and 
(10) Criteria simple to understand and reasonably inexpensive to apply. 
The proposed draft law, which is expressly laid out in the appendix to this 
article, looks particularly attractive in light of these ten incentive system design 
attributes. Responding to each of the ten design criteria set forth above, this draft 
proposed law would: 
(1) Employ objective criteria that are both readily measurable and objective, 
criteria indicating whether top management has acted in a manner that is in keeping 
with an expanded definition of the duty of due care, and criteria that addresses 
whether top management has employed a safe harbor provision to ensure the 
organization would be adequately protected. 
(2) The law would be based on feedback coming from non-conflicted 
disinterested third party auditors or expert consultants—people who are not under 
the direct or indirect control of top management. 
(3) The extent to which top management may be liable or culpable under the 
new law is directly linked to top management’s performance in this important area 
of information security and privacy. 
(4) The new law is furthermore likely to be a significant motivator to spur top 
management to act in a more responsible and forward-thinking manner. Through 
compliance, top management will avoid the unnecessary exposure of their personal 
assets to the liability established by the law. In addition, because the law helps to 
maintain the good reputation of top managers in a community, the law has 
 
 49.  See generally Michael J. Gibbs, et al., Performance Measure Properties and Incentive System 
Design, 48 INDUS. REL. 237 (2009). 
 50.  See generally Sindri Thor Hilmarsson & Pall Rikhardsson, The Evolution of Motivation and 
Incentive Systems Research: A Literature Review, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1965646. 
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psychological and reputational benefits as well. 
(5) The proposed law also appears to be consistent with most common types of 
corporate incentive systems, such as performance review systems, and thus appears 
able to readily become a significant component of a set of incentives that cause top 
management to act in socially responsible ways. 
Furthermore, indicating the topics to be addressed in the balance of this article, 
it is readily observable that: 
(6) The proposed law directly addresses the long-term dynamic experience of a 
particular organization in the information security and privacy area, rather than 
external factors such as a normative static model of good security and privacy, and 
is thus most unlikely to be distorted by extraneous factors outside the control of top 
management. 
(7) Since it affects the personal, financial, and reputational status of top 
management, the proposed law is additionally likely to produce the intended 
effects, notably an improvement in the experienced level of information security 
and privacy. Furthermore, since the new law encourages the provision of a stable 
and reliable information systems infrastructure in support of other organizational 
goals and objectives, the law helps foster congruence and alignment among 
organizational activities. 
(8) The proposed law is unquestionably consistent with organizational goals 
such as fostering good customer relations, being a reliable business partner, 
avoiding the distraction and cost of unnecessary litigation, and maintaining a good 
public reputation. 
(9) The new law addresses results that are directly under the control of top 
management, for example the top managers can decide to retain expert consultants 
necessary to provide them with safe harbor protection against lawsuits. 
(10) The structure of the proposed law is relatively simple, and both its impact 
and its implications can readily be understood by interested constituencies, such as 
top management, employees implementing the law, customers, business partners, 
and the general public. 
It is the top executive in charge of setting and approving the budget for 
information security and privacy that should be held primarily liable for 
information security and privacy. This is consistent with a recent New York Stock 
Exchange Survey,51 which noted that the boards of directors hold Chief Executive 
Officers primarily responsible for security and privacy problems. They hold the 
Chief Information Officer secondarily responsible. In keeping with standard 
industry practice, which this author suggests is a reflection of where the true power, 
responsibility, and accountability lies, this article focuses on the liability of the top 
manager who establishes and approves the budget for information security and 
privacy within the organization. 
 
 51.  See generally Robert Hackett, Here’s Who [sic] Boardrooms Are Blaming for Data Breaches, 
FORTUNE (May 29, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/05/29/boardroom-data-breach-blame. 
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VI. WHY WE MUST NOW EXPRESSLY DEFINE A DUTY OF CARE FOR THE NEW 
STEWARDS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST 
A. The Public Demands Greater Top Management Responsibility Toward the 
Larger Community 
There is widespread acknowledgement in the information systems management 
community that the law regarding information security and privacy needs to be 
changed.52 The law notably needs to be coordinated and centralized at the federal 
level to bring standardization and rationalization to what is often a patchwork of 
state laws.53 Recent efforts to change the law have focused on better sharing of 
information between interested parties.54 Many recently proposed laws have also 
focused on identifying, pursuing, and punishing the perpetrators.55 A focus on 
increasing penalties for perpetrators of computer crimes is illogical if one 
understands the economics of prisons; far more money must be spent on confining 
prisoners than is required for a single prisoner to break the systems that imprison 
him.56 The same economic relationship holds true for information security and 
privacy, and the focus should thus be on the protectors, not on those who break 
existing protection mechanisms. Thus the focus of new and improved law must 
instead be on motivating top management at target organizations to better protect 
their systems. 
Unfortunately to date, very few parties have publicly discussed the 
dysfunctional management incentive systems that have markedly contributed to this 
current state of emergency—the incentive systems that are directly addressed in this 
article. As an indication of the urgent need to bring greater seriousness to the 
information security and privacy area, consider that the European Union’s new 
privacy regulations can involve the imposition of a fine of up to 4% of a 
corporation’s global revenue.57 The potential downside risk of inadequate 
information security is thus rapidly increasing in order to get top management’s 
attention and to motivate top management’s constructive action. The Europeans are 
leading the way in terms of using financial incentives to gain the attention of top 
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management. 
The public is very much aware that there is a lack of alignment between the 
personal objectives of top management and the objectives of third parties, such as 
customers.58 Consider an article by former Goldman Sachs executive director, who 
recently stunned the Wall Street community when he left his job. He explained why 
he left saying, “[t]o put the problem in its simplest terms, the interests of the client 
continue to be sidelined in the way the firm operates and thinks about making 
money.”59  What is needed now is not further polarization between the rich and 
powerful, such as top management, on one hand, and the rest of society on the other 
hand. What we need is an alignment of objectives, so that top management is forced 
to act in a manner that is consistent with the interests of the larger society, rather 
than simply in favor of their own interests, or alternatively, in favor of their own 
interests plus those of shareholders. The real question is not so much about human 
nature and whether people act in their own interests, as it is about how we can find 
alignment60 so that what is best for various constituencies such as business partners, 
customers, and the general public is also best for the top managers choosing those 
options.61 
According to one survey involving 33,000 respondent adults with college 
educations, some 81% agree that a “company can take specific actions that both 
increase profits and improve economic and social conditions in the community 
where it operates.”62 That same study noted the reasons that trust in business has 
decreased in recent times. One of these reasons, noted by some 53% of the 
respondents, was that business “failed to contribute to the greater good.”63 The 
conversation in this area is unfortunately often polarized into a duality, and many 
people erroneously believe we must have either management doing a good job for 
the company and investors, or management attending to community concerns such 
as environmental pollution and information security and privacy. To assure the 
stability and sustainability of our economic and political systems, top management 
can and must simultaneously serve all of these objectives. 
In the area of top management’s obligation to third parties, not just to the 
corporation and shareholders, there has been some significant recent change. For 
example, some thirty states now permit or require directors to consider the effect of 
their decisions not just on shareholders, but on employees, suppliers, customers, 
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creditors of the corporation, and local communities.64 One example of the trend 
toward considering the interests of other constituencies besides the corporation and 
its stockholders comes from Pennsylvania, and that state’s law not only permits 
directors to consider the interests of the other parties, but it also expressly 
encourages a long-term time horizon rather than simply short-term financial gain.65 
B. Information Systems Technology Has Changed Dramatically, Especially 
With the Internet 
Today, the attack launching points have expanded to include a host of mobile 
devices such as tablets and smart phones, and those launching points can be located 
anywhere in the world. Using widely available scripted attack software, non-
technical criminals from other countries– countries with which the United States 
has no extradition treaties– can launch attacks to drain off American financial 
assets. In the past, in-person attacks, such as robbing a bank with a gun, were 
necessary. Accordingly, the job of information security and privacy today is vastly 
more difficult (for example, using encryption, hashing, and digital signatures for 
files) than it was in the past (for example, using locking file cabinets), and thus the 
old-fashioned approaches to management will no longer suffice. The job is 
furthermore considerably more complex because so many of the critical assets that 
must be guarded are intellectual property assets such as copyrights, patents, and 
trademarks.66 Therefore, top management must step up to a much more dedicated, 
professional, and orchestrated effort in the information security and privacy area. 
The targets that are reachable via the Internet are also much more varied and 
available than they used to be. Now, thanks to the “Internet of Things,” we have 
refrigerators, burglar alarm systems, natural gas leak detectors, and a wide variety 
of other types of equipment,67 including large industrial plants like oil refineries, as 
targets that are Internet-connected and potentially vulnerable to attack. The adverse 
implications of deficient management of information security and privacy are grave 
and worthy of the most serious consideration of Congress as well as worthy of 
significant new legislation that is promptly enacted. 
Our economy has become incredibly dependent on reliable, readily available, 
and ubiquitous information. For example, health care records are exchanged 
between doctor’s offices, clinics, hospitals, and insurance companies. If that patient 
health care information were to be altered by unauthorized parties, great harm (such 
as prescribing the wrong drugs) could be done. Identity theft provides another 
example of how the lives of Americans are largely governed by information, 
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information that must be readily available, must be correct, and also must be kept 
securely and privately. The functioning of our modern American economic system 
now depends on the reliable handling of such information, and if top management 
has not been addressing security and privacy adequately, it can hurt many more 
groups of people than simply the donors, stockholders, taxpayers, or other primary 
constituency at the organization where top management works. 
Our tightly integrated information-based economy is also increasingly 
vulnerable to unavailability of the information on which it depends. If, for example, 
the major stock markets, commodity markets, and/or bond markets, all of which are 
highly-automated, were to be tampered with, a host of related businesses in the 
financial services sector would suffer severe losses, and perhaps even be unable to 
operate for a period of time due to a systemic loss of trust in the systems on which 
these firms rely. This very tight integration means that top management cannot 
simply look to the corporation and its shareholders (or its equivalent in other 
organization types) when making decisions; top management must also look to 
third party stakeholders when making decisions related to information security and 
privacy. 
C. Business Structures and Relationships Have Changed Dramatically, 
Especially With Globalization and Outsourcing 
In the past, business activities proceeded in a much more separate and isolated 
manner. Hundreds of years ago, a sole proprietor with a factory making hats might 
personally direct a handful of employees. Their activities were largely separate 
from other parts of the economy, for example because each employee performed 
many different tasks that today would be assigned to many different specialists. 
Back then, employees were effectively “servants,” to use the old legal term, and it 
was appropriate for their sole legal duty and loyalty to be owed to their employer, 
then called the “master”. Today, information is being exchanged much more 
extensively, for example, through social networks like LinkedIn™, so people are 
not nearly as isolated as they were back then. Business networks of relationships are 
much more extensive and enmeshed now, the number of parties involved in a 
process such as making hats is much greater, and the degree of specialization that 
each party plays is also much greater. Thus today, people are coming together more 
intimately, they are communicating with each other more extensively, and they are 
reliant on each other in unprecedented ways. All this means that we are all engaged 
in networks of multi-organizational business relationships, and for the law to 
recognize only one set of duties for top management, namely to the corporation 
(and by extension to the shareholders), that exclusive focus creates dangerous and 
distorted effects, such as serious vulnerabilities in the information security and 
privacy area. 
The Internet has facilitated the spread of global business, increased the level of 
competition, and accelerated the pace of business activities. At the same time, it has 
introduced a wide variety of legal inconsistencies, and created new questions, 
including questions to which there are presently no clear answers. How, for 
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example, is a multinational corporation going to consistently handle the 
inconsistencies in privacy regulations across countries?68  And by which involved 
country should a multinational criminal gang operating on the Internet be 
investigated?69 The provision of goods and services via the Internet from many 
different countries has also jeopardized both national and state sovereignty, for 
example, making it unclear whether sales taxes must be collected on certain 
transactions handled via the Internet.70 For American business to remain 
competitive in this new Internet-based business environment, top management 
cannot simply passively wait until these and related matters are resolved. Their 
attention to these and related issues, including information security and privacy, is 
urgently needed. But unless top management is strongly motivated to take these 
issues seriously, they will continue to employ a laissez-faire approach, in many 
cases simply waiting for the dust to settle before taking decisive action. 
Without getting too technical, it is important to highlight one aspect of the 
increased tempo with which the Internet now forces business to operate. In the past, 
a responsive and reactionary manual approach to attacks was sufficient. For 
example, if a string of banks were to be robbed by a gang driving a car through the 
southern U.S. states, such as the Bonnie and Clyde gang in the 1930s, then a local 
police posse would be sent out to apprehend them. But responsive and reactionary 
approaches alone are totally insufficient in the age of Internet-based crime, Internet-
based terrorism, and Internet-based cyber war. Having only a manual-based reactive 
response to meet an automated attack is a recipe for serious losses. This is because 
many attacks are now automated, and that fact means that defensive measures must 
similarly be proactive, scripted, and automated.71 But very few organizations have 
automated scripted defensive maneuvers implemented to protect their Internet-
connected information systems. A whole different level of sophisticated defense72 
urgently needs to be developed and implemented, and top management must be 
motivated to pay for and oversee the development of such sophisticated defense 
systems. This author submits that top management will not be so motivated unless 
the legal incentive system to which they are subject is altered as described in this 
article. 
 
 68.  See generally Angela Vitale, The EU Privacy Directive and the Resulting Safe Harbor: the Negative 
Effects on U.S. Legislation Concerning Privacy on the Internet, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 321 (2002). 
 69.  See generally Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New 
York State Court of Appeals’ Quest for Principled Decisionmaking [sic], 62 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 70.  See generally Douglas Huenick, Comment, Eliminating the E-Commerce Sales Tax Advantage in the 
United States by Following in the Footsteps of the European Union, 31 WIS. INT’L L.J. 65 (2013). 
 71.  See Richard Steinberger, Proactive vs. Reactive Security, EN POINTE BLOG (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.crime-research.org/library/Richard.html. 
 72.  Alexander Pretschner et al., Raising the Bar for Automated Attacks Against Web Applications Using 
Software Diversity, (unpublished Master’s thesis, Technische Universität München) (on file with Technische 
Universität München), available at 
https://www22.in.tum.de/fileadmin/w00bwn/www/thesis_proposals/Raising_the_Bar_for_Automated_Attack
s_against_Web_Applications_using_Software_Diversity.pdf (describing research now underway indicative of 
the type of scripted defensive work that needs to be done). 
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D. The Rights of Third Parties Are More Directly and Profoundly Affected by 
Top Management Decisions 
i. New Interconnectivity Brings New Relationships 
The new interconnectivity that the Internet, cell phones, and modern computer-
related technology has brought, when combined with modern business 
arrangements, requires that top management exercise a new level of responsibility, 
diligence, and care and concern for parties other than the corporation and by 
extension its stockholders. For example, when a business gathers personal 
information about customers, and maintains that same information in its computer 
systems, it should have a duty to the customers to prevent that information from 
falling into the wrong hands.73 The customers are reliant on top management at the 
business involved to adequately protect the security and privacy of their 
information. For management to fail to use reasonable care in the protection of this 
personal information is akin to the tort of negligent undertaking.74 That tort 
involves the imposition of a legal duty, where a duty would not otherwise exist, 
because third parties relied upon the perpetrator to offer a safe product or service. 
This same tort was, for example, used in litigation related to breast implants.75 
The notion of a duty to third parties76 can also be seen in the creation of a 
neighborhood hazard (legally speaking, an “attractive nuisance”77) such as a 
swimming pool. Unless a locked fence is placed around the pool, the pool is 
adequately maintained, and the pool is properly supervised when used, the pool 
owner may be held liable for injuries sustained.78 Similarly, top management at 
organizations, whether non-profit, for-profit, or governmental, uses a shared 
resource called the Internet, and is also the custodian of customer information, so 
third party customers rely upon top management to do the right thing with respect 
to their personal information.79 
 
 73.  See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (illustrating the absence of a duty 
to third parties such as customers). In that case, the court ruled that the railroad had no duty to protect a 
bystander who was injured from threats that are not immediately obvious to the railroad’s employee. But such 
an approach is out of place in the modern world of information security and privacy, where there are many 
threats that are not immediately obvious, such as computer viruses, and top management should therefore be 
held responsible for protecting against such threats. 
 74.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 75.  In re Silicone Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1447 (N.D. Ala. 1995). 
 76.  The type of duty to third parties recognized in the draft law provided in this article is consistent with 
existing negligence statutes, such as negligent infliction of emotional distress in California. The latter claim 
can only be brought in three limited circumstances: (1) negligent handling of a corpse, (2) negligent 
misdiagnosis of a disease that could potentially harm another, and (3) negligent breach of a duty arising out of 
a preexisting relationship. It is the nature of this third possibility, a preexisting relationship, which is redefined 
and broadened in the draft law. Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992). 
 77.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 339 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 78.  Botner v. Bismarck Parks and Recreation Dist., 782 N.W.2d 662, 663 (N.D. 2010) (finding that the 
owner of a pool may be held liable for injuries suffered under improper supervision). 
 79.  The law now creates inequitable results because no duty of management is recognized toward third 
parties. See, e.g., Huggins v. Citibank, 585 S.E.2d 275, 277 (S.C. 2003). In this case, a victim of identity theft 
attempted to hold a bank responsible for negligently issuing credit cards in his name. Id. The banks issued 
credit cards without any investigation, verification, or corroboration of the applicant’s identity, yet the court 
said there was no duty to the plaintiff victim of identity theft because he was not a customer of the banks. Id. 
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Not only are third parties now inescapably reliant on top management at 
organizations to responsibly manage information security and privacy, but the 
consequences of top management’s failure to adequately and responsibly manage 
this crucial area are potentially much more damaging than in decades gone past. For 
example, Internet access to computerized control systems80 can allow, and, in fact, 
demonstrably has already81 allowed, a remote attacker to shut down the electrical 
power grid for a large geographical area. Thus, these new relationships, the ones 
that information systems and networking technology enable, bring a significant 
magnification of the scale of the damage that might be sustained by third parties 
due to inadequate information security and privacy. 
ii. Recognition of Rights of Third Parties Increasingly Found Elsewhere in the Law 
Likewise, there are some circumstances in which the rights of third parties 
should be recognized and management should not solely be accountable to the 
corporation (and by extension to the shareholders thereof). Consider a case of 
insolvency, where there has been a breach of duty by the management at the firm, 
and as a result, the creditors have lost their money.82 While the duty of the 
management may not normally extend beyond the shareholders, if management’s 
breach of duties was the cause of the loss, then management should be held 
accountable to the creditors, and not permitted to simply shift the loss to the 
shareholders. Coming back to information security and privacy, if management has 
breached its duty to third parties, it should be held personally responsible, and 
likewise, it should not be able to simply transfer the risk to shareholders. 
iii. Increasingly Mandated Terms of Social Engagement 
There are other situations in which reliance on top management can be used to 
create a duty to third parties. This is particularly true when the third parties have no 
choice but to rely on top management to protect their personal information. Many 
aspects of modern business have characteristics of “contracts of adhesion,” in that 
the customer has only two choices: (1) accept the standardized terms and conditions 
that the business offers, because the product or service is desired, or (2) do not 
accept those terms and conditions, and forgo the product or service. Many of these 
products and services are necessary for ordinary life, for instance a credit or debit 
card is generally necessary to buy an airplane ticket on the Internet. If the terms of 
 
 80.  Technically, such systems are called Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. 
Many industrial infrastructure control systems, such as those that control electrical power transmissions, oil 
and gas pipelines, and chemical plant manufacturing operations, are controlled via SCADA systems. For an 
overview of the possible information security and privacy attacks against modern SCADA systems, see 
BONNIE ZHU ET AL., A TAXONOMY OF ATTACKS ON SCADA SYSTEMS (2011), 
http://bnrg.cs.berkeley.edu/~adj/publications/paper-
files/ZhuJosephSastry_SCADA_Attack_Taxonomy_FinalV.pdf. 
 81.  L. Todd Wood, Ukraine: Russia Hacks Power Plants, Highlights U.S. Weakness, THE WASHINGTON 
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/30/l-todd-wood-ukraine-russia-
hacking-power-plants-hi/. 
 82.  This scenario follows closely with the facts in Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 817 
(N.J. 1981). 
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such an adhesion contract are unconscionable, fraudulent, or contrary to public 
policy, then they can be modified or disregarded.83 If, for example, a mandated 
arbitration clause would be clearly detrimental to the customer, because it would 
deny the customer his rights, then it may be set aside by a court of law. This is 
justified under the notion that many customers do not read such contracts, and even 
if they did read the contracts, in many cases they could not understand the legal 
terms therein. Actual assent on the part of consumers in such circumstances is a 
legal fiction.84 Similarly, the current information security and privacy arrangements 
that third parties make with top management is not the result of a fair bargain struck 
between parties on a level playing field, because the third party customers are not 
privy to relevant information security and privacy information. Since these modern 
arrangements do not protect the interests of third parties, nor do they recognize that 
a duty to third parties exists, they must now be set aside, as further described below 
in this article. To fail to recognize a top management duty to third parties is now 
itself unconscionable. 
iv. Third Parties Detrimentally Rely on Management to Look After Their Interests 
This same argument for a top management duty of care owed to third parties, 
for damage done due to negligent or reckless management of information security 
and/or privacy, can be approached from the standpoint of “equitable estoppel” (also 
referred to as, “estoppel in pais”). Equitable estoppel85 would bar a party, in this 
case top management, from asserting a legal claim or defense because that would be 
inconsistent with his or her prior action or conduct. Generally equitable estoppel 
prevents one party from being harmed by another’s voluntary conduct. 
In this case, customers did business with an organization and, by implication, 
also with top management at that organization. In such a case, top management 
also, either implicitly or explicitly, represented that they would protect the 
customer’s personal information as part of the transaction. Later, an attack may 
have leaked such personal information to criminal third parties so that identity theft, 
privacy invasion, and other harms were possible. To hold top management 
responsible for the loss would be possible, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, 
because there had originally been some detrimental reliance that had induced the 
customer to do business with the firm in question. Here, the use of equitable 
estoppel to recognize a duty to third parties would not so much create a right, as it 
would deny top management the ability to use certain defenses that would block 
third party claims for damages. These defenses include the agency relationship, the 
business judgment rule, and the assumption of risk, all of which are taken up in 
greater detail below. 
 
 83.  See generally Bayes v. Merle’s Metro Builders/Blvd. Contr., No. 2007-L-067 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 
 84.  Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 
242 (2002). 
 85.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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E. A Standard of Due Care Now Must Include Duties to Third Parties, Not Just 
the Duty to an Employer via a Fiduciary Relationship 
Economists have long discussed the “tragedy of the commons,” where every 
individual tries to reap the greatest personal benefit from a shared resource.86 For 
example, in the early days of colonization of America, if a plot of land were set 
aside for the grazing of cattle, too many cattle could be placed on the land so that 
the land would be denuded and the soil then eroded. Then the resource would 
become markedly less valuable to anyone. This happens because demand 
overwhelms supply, and every individual who continues to consume what is in the 
commons then harms others who cannot any longer enjoy the benefits of the shared 
resource. 
The Internet is a shared resource with similar attributes to this hypothetical plot 
of land. If top management has failed to allocate sufficient resources for security 
and privacy, they may enjoy higher than otherwise obtainable short-term benefits 
like a bonus based on high firm profits. But others will suffer as a result, and 
everyone will be poorer if this state of affairs is permitted to continue. In order to 
stop the overconsumption of the shared resource, responsibility for managing that 
resource must be established. The assignment of responsibility to top management, 
to observe a duty of care to third parties for information security and privacy, 
achieves that end. This type of solution, where responsibility for protection of a 
shared resource is fixed and assigned, has worked reasonably well for Antarctica, 
which is protected by a treaty that specifies that the continent will not be developed 
for its natural resources and will not be militarized.87 
One of the significant problems in many prior legislative efforts to improve 
information security and privacy was that they have expressly specified controls, 
management solutions, technologies, or other fixed mechanisms that will, 
especially with the rapid speed of change in the information systems field, soon 
become obsolete. What instead must be defined is a reference point with which the 
duty of care for top management can be specifically determined. The proposed law 
in this article does that by making reference to a standard of due care for a 
particular industry. Furthermore, the standard of due care is recognized as a 
dynamic group of controls that will, like the common law, change over time. No 
attempt is made to specify in the law, or even via implementing regulations, exactly 
what control or solutions must be used by a certain organization in order to achieve 
an acceptable level of information security or privacy. This flexible approach helps 
to assure that the law stays relevant and speaks directly to the way to determine and 
measure compliance with a standard of due care, that is specific to a particular 
industry, at a particular point in time. 
Note that only a duty of care toward third parties is needed.88 It is not necessary 
 
 86.  Many attribute the coinage of this term to Victorian economist William Forster Lloyd. It denotes a 
situation where individuals acting independently and rationally according to their own self-interests behave in 
a manner that is contrary to the best interests of the collective because some common resource is thereby 
depleted. 
 87.  The Antarctica Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. 
 88.  Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Exploring the 
Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Reasonable National and International 
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to recognize a fiduciary relationship from top management to third parties. The only 
fiduciary relationship that top management now has is with the corporation itself 
(via the board, and ultimately the shareholders). There is no attempt to change that 
arrangement in this proposed law, and so all the existing law about fiduciary 
relationships for top management would remain the same if this proposed law were 
to be adopted. A fiduciary relationship holds that the agent has a duty to act for the 
principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.89 A new 
fiduciary relationship with third parties would be onerous for top management, 
when all that is needed is a formal legal recognition that a person of ordinary 
prudence would have exercised care under the circumstances, so that negligence 
and recklessness (both in the civil and criminal domains),90 and the damages that go 
along with negligence and recklessness (such as punitive damages), can then be 
established without certain affirmative defenses unduly blocking this process. This 
same least disruptive approach has been adopted in the law at the end of this article. 
F. Differential Power of Negotiating Parties Mandates Greater Top 
Management Personal Responsibility 
i. When Such Great Power is Held in the Hands of Top Management, It Requires 
Greater Accountability 
Top managers must now be legally recognized as stewards of the public trust,91 
because they call the shots related to the management of information systems and 
network infrastructure on which all industrialized nation societies now depend. Top 
management is the only group making decisions about information security and 
privacy—decisions that can adversely affect millions, even billions, of people.92 
Top management is making these decisions without any public visibility or 
accountability, unless of course there is some legal action resulting from the 
ensuing major losses.93 The impact of these decisions can range from permitting an 
 
Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 314 (2015). 
 89.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 90.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 91.  Some more recent cases indicate that the courts realize that top management is often the only one 
who is, in fact, able to make the changes that are necessary. In Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 
477 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court held that a landlord was under a duty to take precautions for the safety of 
tenants “as are within his power and capacity to take” in order to prevent criminal intrusion into the building. 
Id. at 487. In that case, no tenant had the power to take these precautions, such as setting up a CCTV system 
to monitor the hallways. Id 
 92.  Consider that hackers caused a power grid blackout affecting a large part of the Ukraine in October 
2015. Alex Hern, Ukrainian Blackout Caused by Hackers that Attacked Media Company, Researchers Say, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2016), available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/07/ukrainian-
blackout-hackers-attacked-media-company. 
 93.  For example, in the Sony Pictures hack mentioned earlier in this article, emails exchanged between 
top management at Sony and the U.S. State Department were revealed. These emails discuss propaganda, the 
national security implications, and the potential fallout of releasing the movie called “The Interview.”  See 
William Boot, Exclusive: Sony Emails Say State Department Blessed Kim Jong-Un Assassination in “The 
Interview,” THE DAILY BEAST, (Dec. 17, 2014; 2:30 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/17/exclusive-sony-emails-allege-u-s-govt-official-ok-d-
controversial-ending-to-the-interview.html. 
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error that seriously pollutes a public water supply, to enabling the unauthorized shut 
down of a nuclear power plant, to permitting an industrial spy to steal valuable 
intellectual property on which a business’ competitive position has been built.94 
What is now at stake in the information security and privacy field is so 
potentially significant, widely felt, and impactful, it is not sufficient to allow top 
management to make these decisions on their own without being subject to serious 
and quite impactful repercussions if they do not properly safeguard the public trust. 
The draft law at the end of this article attempts to define the circumstances in which 
these repercussions might be felt by top managers who did not live up to their duty 
of care to the public and specific third parties. 
ii. Decision-Making Information—Such as Trade-Offs Between Competing 
Objectives—Is Known Only by Top Management 
Since top management alone is calling the shots, they are making critical 
decisions about information security and privacy—decisions that often nobody 
knows about except those who work for the organization and report directly to these 
top managers and, of course, the involved internal and external auditors.95 The 
opaqueness of and secrecy associated with such decision-making can be justified 
under the legitimate claim that if such information were to fall into the hands of 
third parties, then it could be used to compromise the security and privacy of the 
systems at the organization in question.96 But since third parties, like business 
partners, customers, news reporters, and the general public are not privy to the 
information security and privacy decisions that top management makes, these and 
other third parties cannot possibly negotiate in an informed manner or on an equal 
playing field, on matters related to information security and privacy. The only 
choice that third parties have is the equivalent of an adhesion contract—effectively 
a “take it or leave it” deal. Thus, if an adequate level of information security and 
privacy is going to be obtained, that adequate level must be measured and gauged 
by what was created as a result. 
With this secrecy and opaqueness kept in mind, we can conclude that if serious 
losses were sustained because top managers did not adhere to their duty of care with 
respect to third parties, then those top managers should be held personally liable. 
On the other hand, if no serious losses were sustained, we can infer that, at least for 
 
 94.  Things are getting much worse as well. According to one highly respected annual survey of business, 
2015 saw 38% more detected information security incidents than the prior year, and the detected incidents of 
intellectual property theft increased 56% in 2015 as well. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 65, at 24. 
 95.  Freedom of Information Act limitations for proprietary information, trade secret laws, sealed court 
records, confidential settlement agreements, and confidentiality provisions found in contracts will often block 
information about these security and privacy decisions from being discovered by the general public, interested 
third parties, or the media. Note that this Act relates to the federal government only. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2016). 
 96.  While “security through obscurity” is generally not a desirable strategy because auditors and experts 
should examine controls to determine whether they are working properly, there is definitely a place for 
keeping security and privacy information confidential. The way that the proposed law in the appendix to this 
article deals with the need for “another pair of eyes” is through expert third party audits. There is no call for, 
nor is there a need for, disclosure of control information to the general public, customers, shareholders, or 
other large groups of people. 
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the time being, top management’s duty of care to third parties appears to have been 
met. Of course, due to the opaqueness and secrecy of the relationship between top 
management and third parties and the associated lack of third party knowledge 
about what actually goes on behind the scenes, the duty of care may not, in fact, 
have been met. If the liability exposure described in this article’s proposed law, 
however, is adopted, management will nonetheless be spurred to do the right thing 
because there will be a prospect in the near future that serious losses may be 
suffered, at which point top management could be held personally liable for those 
losses. 
iii. Third Parties Lack Legal Property Rights in Their Own Information with Which 
to Gain Negotiation Leverage 
On a related point, the law also puts third parties at a distinct power 
disadvantage in this negotiation with top management about information security 
and privacy because information about third parties is not recognized as the 
property of those same third parties.97 Thus, it is, for example, the sole decision of 
top management to keep or delete certain personal information which may be 
innocuous and seemingly insignificant, but later, when new data mining systems are 
employed, may help to paint a picture about personal activities that would reveal 
information that the third party never intended to reveal (thereby disclosing medical 
conditions, sexual orientation, political leanings, etc.).98 
Third parties are forced to disclose personal information in order to get desired 
products and/or services that the organization in question is providing. Third 
parties, such as consumers buying software, do not really have any bargaining 
power when it comes to how information about them will be stored, protected, 
shared, etc.99 While there are some basic laws about disclosure and limited sharing 
of personal information in some industries such as banking100 and health care,101 
 
 97.  This is distinctly different than member states in the European Union, which do recognize third party 
rights in information that describes them. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 38. This 
right is more recently in the news because the European Union recognizes the right of individuals to have no-
longer-occurring personal information about them removed from public records. This is more colloquially 
known as the “right to be forgotten.” Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43, 44. 
 98.  The power of the “mosaic theory” is not generally appreciated, including by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
This theory posits that seemingly unrelated pieces of personal information can readily be combined (for 
instance via data mining software) to create a whole new picture, a picture that reveals private information 
that the data subject never intended to reveal. This notion is an important part of the discussion about the 
duration of monitoring a car’s movements via a GPS system and what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure through information collection, as discussed in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012); 
Matthew B. Kugler, Surveillance Duration Doesn’t Affect Privacy Expectations: An Empirical Test of the 
Mosaic Theory (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law and Econ., U. Chi. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 727, 2015), 
available at 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2419&context=law_and_economics. 
 99.  Clicking on a button that says “I agree,” as is often done with software “clickwrap” agreements, 
hardly amounts to bargaining. Nonetheless, cases decided to date generally uphold such agreements as 
enforceable. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 100.  For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 created some much needed limitations on the 
transfer of bank customer information to third parties. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338 (1999). 
 101.  For example, the HIPAA of 1996 restricts the types of parties who can receive personal health care 
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for the most part, information disclosed by third parties to American organizations 
(for profit, non-profit, and government) becomes the property of the organization to 
which the information was disclosed. Unless third parties can make a legal claim to 
some property rights in information about them, it will remain quite difficult for 
these third parties to legally compel top management to do anything of significance 
in the information security and privacy area. 
There can be no level field bargaining unless consumers have some direct 
leverage with which to bargain with management. At this time, American 
consumers have no direct bargaining chips with which force management to 
adequately protect information and information systems. All consumers have is 
indirect leverage through exposure in the media and the threat of actions taken by 
federal or state regulatory authorities.102 Thus, unless the current legal regime 
regarding property rights in personal information is going to be dramatically 
changed (and this does not appear to be happening at any time in the near future), 
top management must be held personally liable for damage done to third parties 
because top management has failed to meet the duty of care to these same third 
parties.103 The proposed law at the end of this article attempts to achieve this 
objective: establishing a balanced power between top management and affected 
third parties by introducing the least possible number of changes in the current legal 
system. 
 
VII. HOW THE LAW OF AGENCY ACTS AS A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SHIELD FOR THE 
BENEFIT OF TOP MANAGEMENT 
A. Liability Imposed on the Principal for Torts of the Agent Provides 
Insufficient Motivation 
The outdated understanding of the agency relationship is that top management 
was the servant (agent) of the board of directors (master).104 As such, top 
management should be protected from personal liability by agency law because it 
 
information. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (1996). 
 102.  One example is provided by state breach notification laws, which due to their inconsistencies and 
variations point strongly to the need for federal consolidation of legislation in this area. See, e.g., Michael 
Greenberger & Matthew Swinburne, The Maryland Personal Information Protection Act: Strengthening 
Maryland’s Security Breach Notification Law, 42 U. BALT. L. F. 129 (2012). 
 103.  Identity theft provides a good example of how consumers have little say over how information about 
them is controlled or handled; mishandling of this information by a business, and the resulting identity theft, 
may unjustly cause a consumer to suffer denial of a loan, denial of a job, and additional costs although they 
were in no way at fault. See J. Howard Beales III, Remarks of J.Howard Beales, III, Director, Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Before the 2003 Symposium on the Patriot Act, Consumer 
Privacy, and Cybercrime, 5 N.C. J. L. & TECH 1, 9 (2003). 
 104.  Some definitions are in order per the Restatement (Second) of Agency. A “master” is a principal 
who employs an agent to perform service in his affairs and who controls, or has the right to control, the 
physical conduct of the other in the performance of the service. A “servant” is an agent employed by a master 
to perform services in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or 
subject to the right to control by the master (note the personal relationship and intimate communication 
implied by these definitions). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
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was by implication serving the will of its principal (the board of directors acting for 
the investors), so long as top management was acting within the scope of its 
employment.105 Vicarious liability doctrine imposes liability on the principal (here, 
the corporation or organizational unit) for the torts of its agents (here, top 
management). Perversely, this can render the principal in an employment 
relationship responsible for the self-serving independently chosen acts of an agent. 
For example, in the context of employment discrimination, employers are legally 
responsible for the discriminatory acts of supervisory employees, even when the 
discrimination was the result of a specific supervisor’s discriminatory animus 
which occurred contrary to company policy and without the knowledge of corporate 
management.106 
Under common law, an agent-employee (such as a top manager) can be held 
liable for his own acts, even when an employer (such as the corporation) is also 
held vicariously liable,107 but the business judgment rule, which is discussed at 
length in the next major section of this article, prevents that personal liability for 
top management from being used in practice. While there is disagreement among 
the courts108 about holding agents personally liable for their actions, the prevailing 
theory, at least in the employment discrimination field, is that the existence of 
vicarious liability (respondeat superior) creates an incentive for employer principals 
to manage their agents. This author disagrees, claiming that such a theory creates a 
significant disincentive for agents to exercise due diligence. Instead, this author 
proposes a liability scheme that allows joint and several liability, an approach under 
which both the employer and its agent could be held liable. He suggests such joint 
and several liability would provide the most influential set of incentives to achieve 
the desired levels of information security and privacy. 
B. Supervision by the Board of Directors Inadequately Controls Activities of 
Top Management 
The shield that the law of agency now provides to top management is 
predicated on an assumption that the board of directors (representing the 
shareholders) would actively manage the organization’s top managers.109 While 
that assumption may have been true in centuries gone past, today it is certainly no 
 
 105.  Scope of employment is addressed in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2, comment D. As is taken 
up in greater detail in the following section of this article, the master’s liability for acts of its servants is 
restricted to acts within the scope of employment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 1958). 
 106.  Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 (1986); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
 107.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343, (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 108.  See Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment Discrimination, 30 
GA. L. REV. 509, 549 (1996). 
 109.  Some may wonder why this article does not expressly address the personal liability of members of 
the board of directors. The short answer is that board members are only tangentially involved in important 
decisions about information security and privacy. A more lengthy answer is that a substantially different set of 
laws applies to directors. Consider the “oversight doctrine” which has been manifest in Delaware law. It 
imposes liability on directors (but not top management) under certain circumstances only if there is a breach 
of the duty of loyalty. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Managing Expectations: Does the Director’s Duty to Monitor 
Promise More Than It Can Deliver?, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 416 (2012). 
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longer true.110 The active management influence of boards has dwindled, and top 
management now largely runs major corporations and government agencies.111 
Operational management and governance, including the ability to make critical 
trade-off decisions in the domain of information security and privacy, is now 
attended to by top management, while the board handles only game-changing 
decisions (such as mergers and acquisitions), strategic direction, and overall policy 
matters. Thus, boards do not actively manage top management when it comes to 
information security and privacy.112 The shots in the area of concern addressed in 
this article are thus called solely by top management,113 and it is therefore fitting to 
hold top management personally liable for markedly deficient information security 
and privacy that leads to a serious loss. A legislative policy decision to hold top 
management personally liable is consistent with recent research that shows that 
corporate wrongdoing, rather than organizational culture, more often results from 
actions, deliberate or inadvertent, by the top management of the perpetrator 
organization.114 
If top management is no longer simply following the orders of the board, then it 
should no longer be insulated from liability as though it was acting as a “servant,” 
as the law of agency would dictate.115 Top management instead now acts as though 
they are operating their own business, much like a sole proprietorship. If a sole 
proprietorship involves exposure of the owner to liability for the decisions that his 
or her workers make, why is it that top management in major corporations should 
be legally insulated from liability116 for effectively the same actions (especially 
when the influence of those actions is magnified by scale, as is the case with 
multinational corporations)? It is the contention of this author that top management 
should not be so shielded against the effects of their decisions and that to hold them 
 
 110.  Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
 111.  This observation is by no stretch of the imagination new and has been discussed for decades, along 
with conversation about the need for more formal legal acknowledgement of a corporation’s duty to parties 
besides shareholders and creditors. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
 112.  If one closely examines the current institutional arrangements applicable to large corporations, which 
have a large number of geographically diverse, often anonymous investors, it becomes quite clear that it is a 
logistical impossibility for the shareholders (or their representatives on the board) to closely manage top 
management in most situations, save those where ownership is highly concentrated in a few individuals; the 
addition of limited liability for investors to induce them to invest discourages shareholders from exercising 
direct operational control over top management; board consent for top management to serve in a certain 
capacity should not be equivalent to indemnification of top management for all acts; see David A. Westbrook, 
A Shallow Harbor and a Cold Horizon: The Deceptive Promise of Modern Agency Law for the Theory of the 
Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1369 (2012). 
 113.  Nicole Beebe et al., Framing Information Security Budget Requests to Influence Budget Decisions, 
35 COMM. OF THE ASS’N FOR INFO. SYS., 133, 134 (2014). 
 114.  William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 1343, 1411 (1999). 
 115.  See Watteau v. Fenwick (1893), 1 Q. B. 346 (finding, under English law, a third party could hold the 
principal liable for the acts of the agent, even though the agent knowingly disobeyed the principal’s 
instructions, so long as the agent’s acts appeared to be within the normal scope of the agent’s duties). 
 116.  This author has no problem with the possibility that a principal may be held liable for the acts of its 
agent under various doctrines such as implied agency, inherent agency, and actual authority. On the other 
hand, it is a problem when top management acts largely unilaterally but is not held personally liable that an 
incentive for abuse and/or socially undesirable results is created. For discussions of these three agency 
doctrines. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
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personally liable encourages appropriate attention to the important tasks of 
information security and privacy—tasks that are demonstrably not being adequately 
addressed at the present time. 
C. Management Supervision Structures of Early Industrial Age Do Not Scale-
Up and Are Still Not Relevant 
Another assumption of the current agency law is that the supervision structure, 
and the inherent legal obligations that were applicable to a sole proprietor and his 
handful of workers in the 1890s, in the early days of the Industrial Revolution, is 
still applicable to modern organizations that involve hundreds and even thousands 
of employees. Here reference is explicitly being made to the shielding the agent has 
against liability for his acts, because he is, after all, simply operating on behalf of 
his principal. Such an extreme shield of agents can only work where very close 
contact between principal and agent is the normal interaction, and great control over 
the agent can be thereby exercised. This principal-agent supervision and legal 
obligation model cannot be workable with the scale of modern enterprises such as 
multinational corporations or industrialized nation centralized government agencies. 
It is practically impossible to closely manage top management in such a situation 
where so many parties are involved. This workability problem is exponentially 
made worse when one considers that the Internet now incorporates a large number 
of new constituencies, again making the exclusive focus on the intimate old-
fashioned principal-agent relationship antiquated, quaint, and totally inapplicable. 
The only reasonable way forward is to hold top management personally responsible 
for their personally chosen actions by the law related to negligence and 
recklessness. That is what the proposed law in the appendix attempts to achieve. 
D. “Invisible Hand” of the Marketplace Does Not Cause Imbalances to Be 
Adjusted Automatically 
Still another assumption inherent in the established agency law is that the 
capitalistic market will automatically adjust with an “invisible hand” to 
accommodate new conditions.117 In the information security and privacy field, 
current events are moving far too fast for us to wait for the market to gradually 
accommodate and adapt to new conditions. The risks are far too great, and the 
assets at risk are far too valuable,118 for this old-fashioned approach to be used 
alone. Furthermore, the market often relies upon a profound crisis119 in order to 
bring about structural change, but this country cannot afford to suffer a still more 
 
 117.  For a critical discussion, see E. K. HUNT & MARK LAUTZENHEISER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC 
THOUGHT: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 424 (3d. ed. 2011). 
 118.  At this point in time, 88% of the S&P 500’s market value is goodwill and intangible assets, such as 
reputation, brand, and customer experience—all of which are extremely vulnerable to information security 
and privacy problems. Go back to 1975, and these same assets were only 17% of the market value of these 
companies. See NYSE & VERACODE, supra note 4, at 2. 
 119.  In keeping with this point, many experts in the information security and privacy field believe that 
significant change in the legal structure surrounding information security and privacy will only come about 
through a so-called “digital Pearl Harbor” event. See SEYMOUR E. GOODMAN & HERBERT S. LIN, TOWARD A 
SAFER AND MORE SECURE CYBERSPACE 223 (2007), available at http://www.nap.edu/read/11925/chapter/15. 
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severe crisis in the information security and privacy area. This “faith in the market” 
type of market adjustment is also not happening because there is an insufficient 
number of readily available market participants to make the theory a reality. For 
instance, if there is only one cell phone company that offers acceptable service at a 
customer’s house in a remote rural area, then that customer cannot realistically 
switch service providers in protest about his phone company’s negligent handling 
of his personal data. 
Similarly, parties that might create competing business arrangements with 
preferable allocations of liability are not realistically able to establish their own 
country where a different set of laws would prevail. The inability of the capitalistic 
marketplace to deal with situations where no responsibility has been allocated can 
be found in the “tragedy of the commons” situation mentioned above, where a 
shared resource is accordingly degraded or even destroyed, because responsibility 
for the management of that resource is not explicitly assigned to certain parties. 
Indeed, as discussed above in the sections about incentive systems, even though the 
efforts of top managers are urgently needed to solve this problem, top managers 
personally benefit under the current legal system if they continue to follow a 
process characterized by inaction in the information security and privacy area. 
Even if the reader were a firm believer in the efficiency of the marketplace and 
its adaptability, there is still a place for the integration of moral codes into the law. 
Doing what is right for society as a whole, in this context ensuring that the 
information systems on which we all depend include adequate security and privacy, 
that objective seems to be a relatively easy moral code behind which most people 
could align.120 Thus, the law now needs to be adjusted to accommodate the new 
conditions, and lawmakers and policymakers should not assume that the 
marketplace is infinitely self-adaptive.121 In some areas, intervention is necessary, 
and based on the emergency conditions that now prevail, information security and 
privacy is one of those areas in which legal intervention with the mechanisms of the 
market is required. 
E. Important Management Tasks Cannot Remain Unassigned Without Causing 
Significant Adverse Repercussions 
Rather than being an explicit assumption, perhaps it would be better to call this 
next topic an area of unconsciousness in need of more explicit attention. There 
appears to be an all-too-common default belief in the legal and business 
communities that it is acceptable, indeed even workable, for important tasks to 
remain unassigned to specific individuals. This practice is contrary to generally 
 
 120.  For a discussion about the morality associated with leaving such decisions to the market, see 
BERNARD HODGSON, THE INVISIBLE HAND AND THE COMMON GOOD (2004). 
 121.  The need for major changes in the law to deal with the new information security and privacy risks is 
recognized by other English common law countries, such as Australia (which is considering the introduction 
of a new tort, but this article takes a more conservative approach, opting instead to adjust the existing 
negligence and recklessness laws so as to accommodate new conditions); see AUSTL. L. REFORM 
COMMISSION, SERIOUS INVASIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL ERA (2014), available at 
https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/1-executive-summary/should-new-tort-be-enacted. 
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accepted accounting principles,122 just as it is contrary to generally accepted 
information systems security and privacy practices.123 Consistent with that 
assumption, or perhaps “consistent with that unconsciousness,” assignment of 
liability-related responsibility for information security and privacy is still nebulous 
and ill-defined.124 While it is acknowledged that this is a new field and both the 
legal and business communities are understandably still adapting to information 
security and privacy, explicit assignment of legal responsibility is now urgently 
needed.125 The draft law proposed in this article is an attempt to obtain explicit 
assignment of responsibility of liability to top management because it is clearly the 
single group in a position to most effectively improve the current state of affairs. 
Management studies have clearly shown that by assigning responsibility and 
accountability, desired behavior is encouraged and motivated.126 
VIII. HOW THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE ACTS AS A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 
SHIELD FOR THE BENEFIT OF TOP MANAGEMENT 
A. We Must Admit the Total Insufficiency of Top Management Knowledge in 
This Area 
The business judgment rule is defined in many different ways,127 but in general 
terms, it holds that top managers will not be held personally liable for the results of 
a business decision if the defendant top managers: (1) were not personally 
interested in the subject matter and made the decision in good faith, (2) were 
reasonably informed about the subject matter to the extent that they deemed 
necessary under the circumstances, and (3) rationally believed that the choice made 
was in the best interests of the organization.128 
One the most serious problems with the business judgment rule is found in the 
second element, which involves management’s thought and belief about the extent 
to which the state of being informed has been achieved, or the state which is 
required in order to make this particular decision. To use top management’s thought 
and belief as a reference point is not only arbitrary and difficult to ascertain 
 
 122.  COMMITTEE ON GOV’T AFFAIRS, 95TH CONGRESS, IMPROVING THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC 
OWNED CORPORATIONS AND THEIR AUDITORS 6, (Comm. Print 1977). 
 123.  NAT’L BUREAU OF STANDARDS, AUDIT AND EVALUATION OF COMPUTER SECURITY II: SYSTEM 
VULNERABILITIES AND CONTROLS §4.1.5 (1980). 
 124.  Christopher McClean, The Hacking Economy: Five Things the Sony Hack Exposed, CNBC (Dec. 30, 
2014, 2:49 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/30/5-things-the-sony-hack-exposed-commentary.html. 
 125.  This claim is consistent with the very important work being done by the Information Systems Audit 
& Control Association (ISACA), as exemplified in their report, INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE: 
GUIDANCE FOR BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 2006); see also David 
Orozco, Amending the Economic Espionage Act to Require the Disclosure of National-Security Related 
Technology Thefts, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 877, 900 (2013) (discussing the nebulous nature of this area of the 
law). 
 126.  See, e.g., Jesse W. Brogan, Improving Lean Six Sigma Process with Lean Six Sigma, iSIX SIGMA, 
http://www.isixsigma.com/implementation/deployment-structure/improving-lean-six-sigma-process-lean-six-
sigma (discussing industrial engineering and quality control, and the importance of assigning responsibility 
and accountability). 
 127.  See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1994). 
 128.  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c), (1994). 
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empirically in a trial, but it is also going to inevitably dangerously expose not just 
the organization itself, but also third parties to unnecessary vulnerabilities. This 
undue exposure results from the fact that top management is not aware of the latest 
threats, problems, management techniques, and issues in the information security 
and privacy fields. 
It is not top management’s job to stay on top of such matters, and it would be 
unrealistic to expect that they would devote the time necessary to stay on top of the 
latest in the information security and privacy areas, given the highly demanding 
nature of their actual jobs. At the same time, to provide an adequate level of 
information security and privacy, the organization that top management oversees, 
must employ an “on top of the latest” approach to information security or privacy, 
or the organization will soon be victimized by hackers, industrial spies, disgruntled 
ex-employees, organized criminals, hostile nation state actors, and other 
adversaries. 
So the reference point for determining whether information security is adequate 
must be built upon a demonstrably verifiable external standard, that reflects the 
latest developments, and that can be attested to by independent third party experts. 
Such an approach has been shown to be useful in the publicly released financial 
statements area,129 via the use of Certified Public Accountants providing a 
professional opinion based on an independent audit. That same third party expert 
opinion approach can and should be applied to the information security and privacy 
field as well. The law in the appendix to this article takes that same approach, and 
the business judgment rule must be restricted so as to limit management’s thoughts 
and beliefs to those matters that are demonstrably consistent with independent third 
party expert opinion. One example of such a restriction of the business judgment 
rule is found in the draft law found in the appendix to this article. 
B. We Must Also Admit the Courts Cannot Reasonably Assess Conflicts in this 
Area 
Another serious problem associated with the business judgment rule, as 
evidenced by the first element in the definition of that rule provided above, is that 
the rule assumes that the courts can reasonably assess130 whether top management 
is interested, i.e., whether they have a conflict related to the decision to be made.131 
Not only is this unduly consuming of limited court resources, in opposition to the 
much bandied-about legal objective of judicial economy, but to suppose that 
management could be unconflicted and uninterested is contrary to the evidence 
discussed earlier in this article which delves extensively into the dysfunctional 
 
 129.  For a demonstrably useful example of the type of third party reviews that could be applied to the 
information security and privacy area, see AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, 
CLARIFIED STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS (2015), 
http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/Pages/clarifiedSAS.aspx. 
 130.  Of course, the court does not want to make this assessment either for reasons of judicial economy, if 
for no other reason. Courts are also generally run by lawyers (acting as judges), and those people in general 
have no special expertise in either modern management nor in technology. 
 131.  One of the leading decisions in this area is Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), in 
which the court emphasized that it is critical that directors operate with the “utmost good faith and the most 
scrupulous inherent fairness.”  Id. at 710. 
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incentive systems now in place. 
Top management is clearly now incentivized to focus on the short-term, high-
bonus-producing, quick results solution, and not the long-term investment that is 
needed, or the difficult and time-consuming area now urgently in need of much 
more of their attention. The fact that many buy-out deals and other major corporate 
merger and acquisitions transactions now involve review by separate committees is 
evidence that a third party independent viewpoint is needed.132 The need to appear 
to have integrity and independence is evidence with these special committees, and 
they would not be used as a standard practice unless management conflicts and 
personal interests were not serious issues.133 
C. We Must Admit that the Line Was Improperly Drawn at Lack of Fraud, Bad 
Faith, or Other Nefarious Intentionality 
Still another problem with the business judgment rule is that it allows top 
management to evade liability, so long as their unwise decisions or other 
wrongdoings are not intentional.134 These days, it is not enough to simply require 
that there be no intentional misconduct.135 Today, with the incredible powers and 
responsibilities that go along with being a top manager at a major corporation, a 
large government agency, or a well-known major non-profit, there must be liability 
exposure for not adequately attending to the important needs of third parties, such 
as properly protecting the information security and privacy of these third parties. 
For example, should the top management decisions that allowed the Sony 
Pictures hack to take place, a hack which cost the studio at least $15 million,136 
simply be passed along to the shareholders without any contributory payments from 
top management? The total loss amount sustained by Sony as a result of the hack is 
peanuts compared to the massive losses that we, as a society, now potentially face 
because top management made unintentional and unwise short-term decisions 
related to information security and privacy. Clearly, “it wasn’t intentional” should 
not be a permissible excuse with which to dismiss management personal liability. 
 
 132.  See Scott V. Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Committee – Ensuring Business Judgment 
Rule Protection in the Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate Transactions 
Involving Conflicts of Interest, 43 BUS. LAW. 665 (1988). 
 133.  In certain circumstances, courts have found that the business judgment rule does not protect the 
directors or top managers, and that there has been a breach of the duty of due care, and that directors or top 
management should thus be held personally liable for damages. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 
(Del. 1985). Likewise, the draft law in this article seeks to hold top management personally liable. 
 134.  See Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (App. Div. 1976). This case involved the 
directors making a decision which cost the shareholders a great deal of money, but since there was no fraud or 
self-dealing shown by the plaintiff shareholders, no award to the plaintiffs was provided. In the words of the 
court, “more than imprudence and mistaken judgment must be shown” thanks to the business judgment rule. 
Id. at 813. 
 135.  See Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F.Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945). The old fashioned view was 
evident in this case, where the court reasoned that “mistakes or errors in the exercise of honest business 
judgment do not subject the officers and directors to liability for negligence in the discharge of their duties.”  
Id. at 911. 
 136.  Cecilia Kang, Sony Pictures Hack Cost the Movie Studio at Least $15 Million, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 
2015), www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2015/02/04/sony-pictures-hack-cost-the-movie-studio-at-
least-15-million. 
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Top management discretion needs to be narrowed, and making serious errors or 
omissions in the information security and/or privacy area should no longer be 
excused because negative intentionality is missing.137 
D. We Must Acknowledge that the Message Sent to the Public Is Inadequate & 
Itself Doing Harm to the Public Trust in Modern Institutions 
When so few American top managers are held personally responsible138 for the 
wrongdoing of their corporations, what kind of a message does that send to the 
public?139 Rather than indirectly sending the message that those at the top can now 
get away with such crimes and torts,140 a good argument can be made for increasing 
the severity of penalties resulting from the number of people affected, the amount 
of money involved, the abuse of power by top managers, and the reputational 
damage to the organization in question.141 Socially, it is considered worse when a 
leader establishes a low standard for the organization’s norm because others follow 
that leader. Therefore, if a top manager has been involved in criminal or abusive 
conduct, that conduct should be severely penalized. 
A good argument can also be made for severe penalties because top 
management is, due to their great wealth relative to the rest of the population, not 
incentivized unless they suffer a very significant personal loss of wealth. Making 
the personal liability risk that top management potentially faces very severe can 
counter the fact that third parties have no legal basis for negotiation in the decisions 
that top management is making about information handling and information 
systems—decisions that affect those same third parties profoundly. 
There is a counterargument against increasing liability exposure for top 
management that claims that corporations are better able to handle the greater 
liability exposure that goes along with today’s multinational corporations and other 
large organizations.  While it is true that the corporation, government agency, or 
non-profit organization involved may have deeper pockets than top managers, the 
 
 137.  See Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N.Y. 519, 532 (1888). The old-fashioned view embodied in that case 
now must be changed. That court wrote “mere errors of judgment are not sufficient as grounds for equity 
interference [establishing a violation of a duty of care]; for the powers of those entrusted with corporate 
management are largely discretionary.” Id. at 532. We must now move beyond discretionary powers granted 
to top management, and hold top management to a standard of due care that can be established via external 
sources such as expert testimony. 
 138.  E.g., FDIC v. Castetter, 184 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 1999). In that case, bank directors were not held 
personally liable for acting negligently and causing their bank to fail because the business judgment rule set 
the negligence standard high (effectively gross negligence), and the directors therefore were deemed to be not 
guilty. 
 139.  In 2014, some 75% of the general public surveyed in a poll said they see widespread government 
corruption, so it would be naïve to believe that there is not a serious perception issue in this area (this is 
markedly up from 2009 when 66% felt the same). 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption, 
GALLUP.COM (Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-government-corruption.aspx. 
 140.  Even those living in foreign countries comment on how American executives seem to “get away 
with it” these days. See Joris Luyendijk, Now the Bankers’ Triumph is Complete, GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2016), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/22/bankers-triumph-complete-the-big-short. 
 141.  See generally Harold G. Grasmick & Donad E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and 
Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980) (finding that 
internalization, social opprobrium, and official penalties all had a significant impact when it comes to 
influencing criminal behavior). 
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corporation is not making the decisions and it is not incentivized to act one way or 
another, unlike top managers.  Furthermore, nothing in the proposed law found in 
this article eliminates or changes the doctrine of respondeat superior,142 so the 
corporation (or other organizational entity) can still, at least in theory, provide 
additional assets to help settle the claims of third parties were they to be damaged 
by the information security and privacy related crimes or torts of top management. 
E. An Adjustment for the Lack of a Third Party Voice is Now Required 
Furthermore, to hold the shareholders solely liable for disastrous decisions 
involving information security and privacy, decisions over which the shareholders 
had little or no influence, is not just ineffective, but inequitable.  While 
shareholders may diversify away some of this risk by making multiple investments 
in different organizations in an effort to reduce their potential adverse personal 
consequences, top management by design cannot diversify away the personal 
liability exposure that they face through a law such as the one provided in the 
appendix to this article.  That is desirable because top management must be 
constantly facing the prospect of losing everything they own because they were 
negligent or reckless when it comes to information security and privacy. The safe 
harbor rules described in this draft law are relatively clear and straightforward, and 
top management can, in fact, readily make sure that they will not be hit with a 
successful negligence or recklessness civil lawsuit or criminal prosecution under 
this draft law. Therefore, compliance with such a law would actually not be an 
onerous proposition, while non-compliance would, in contrast, bring extreme and 
unnecessary risk, a risk that every rational top manager would refuse to accept. The 
relative risk exposure associated with compliance and non-compliance, in turn, 
should motivate top management behavior to properly look after the needs of third 
parties in the area of information security and privacy. 
Thus, we come back to the critical distinction between bearing risk for 
unintentional acts and bearing risk for intentional acts. The corporation is the better 
entity to bear risk for unintentional acts, while top management is the better entity 
to bear the risk for knowing and intentional acts.143 On balance, greater harm would 
result, and top management would be less motivated to act in a socially-minded 
manner if the risk was to be borne solely by the organization rather than by both the 
organization and top management personally.144 Accordingly, the draft law in this 
article was written with the intention of deterring bad behavior on the part of top 
 
 142.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (translating respondeat superior 
into English, specifying it means, “let the master answer;” in the employment context, an employer is subject 
to liability for torts committed by employees while those employees are acting within the scope of their 
employment). 
 143.  Vikramaditya, supra note 30, at 1254-55. 
 144.  See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1477, 1496-97 (1966). Shareholders have not historically been able to manifest sufficient visibility and 
monitoring of top management activities so as to be able to control top management activity in this area, 
specifically so as to motivate top management not to take undue risks with the corporation’s assets. While 
shareholders could theoretically modify top management employment contracts to include such incentives, to 
date, there has been scant real world action this area, and the possibility remains but a theory. 
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management,145 setting an example of those top managers who abuse their position, 
and forcing top management to take right actions. 
F. An Externally Defined Standard of Due Care Is Now Essential 
While the notion of a fiduciary duty to shareholders and the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, both discussed above, imply a duty of care to which top 
management must subscribe, it should be noted that that duty is to the shareholders, 
donors, taxpayers, or other primary constituency that the organization serves. The 
duty of care for top managers, however, is not currently owed to third parties, but as 
discussed at length at the beginning of this article, it must now – given our new 
inter-connected industrial society information systems infrastructure (such as the 
Internet) – also be owed to third parties who have a relationship with the 
organization, third parties who could be adversely impacted by decisions that top 
management makes in the information security and privacy field.  Having a legally-
defined, expert-vouched duty of care to the constituencies served is common to 
many professionals, such as accountants, lawyers, architects, engineers, and 
medical doctors.146 Why then are top managers in corporations not also subject to 
having their duty of care defined by the externally-referenced standard of due care? 
Tradition and history could be offered up as explanations, but top managers having 
only a legally recognized loyalty to their employer (the organization and its owners) 
must now change. 
Continuing with the need for an externally-referenced and expert-vouched 
standard of due care for top management, one should note that two of the three 
elements in the business judgment rule are determined by the defendant top 
manager. Notably, the top manager must (1) have made a reasonably informed 
decision147 – as he or she would believe that level of being informed to be – as 
established by a very low gross negligence standard, and (2) the top manager must 
have some rational belief that the decision was in the organization’s best interest – 
established by a very low threshold, essentially not totally beyond the bounds of 
reason.148 That two of the essential three elements in the business judgment rule 
allow the defendant to make up their own story about how he or she has met the 
standard of proper conduct is totally unacceptable in this day and age when so much 
is riding on top managers making the right decisions. This type of self-evaluation 
invites not just unwarranted excuse, but also abuse, and provides scant protection of 
third parties who must be protected. Top management must now be subject to an 
externally defined standard of due care, as is suggested in the draft law at the end of 
this article. 
 
 145.  The single most important factor associated with allocating liability between the corporation, top 
management, and injured third parties is the degree of care exercised by the enterprise and by the agent. See 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for 
Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345 (1982). Note that this article advocates neither agent liability alone, nor 
enterprise liability alone, instead suggesting that liability of both brings about superior long-run socially-
desirable results. 
 146.  See H. H. Henry, Annotation, Necessity of Expert Evidence to Support an Action for Malpractice 
Against a Physician or Surgeon, 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962). 
 147.  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 148.  Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1045 (Pa. 1997). 
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G. Existing Moral Hazard Must Be Removed 
Before leaving the topic of the problems associated with the business judgment 
rule, the moral hazard149 associated with holding only an entity liable for the acts of 
its top management that damage third parties should also be mentioned. Vicarious 
liability alone, where the organization is held liable for the criminal or abusive acts 
of top management, will incentivize top management to engage in more acts of that 
nature.150 This is because top management does not personally pay the price, and if 
they can personally reap the benefits (for example through higher quarterly 
bonuses, as discussed earlier in this article), then they will seek out arrangements 
that will allow them to strike such deals and engage in such arrangements. 
Shifting of the responsibility to the organization encourages the view that this 
area should be handled with risk management, for example with insurance,151 rather 
than by designing incentive systems that motivate top management to act in a 
manner that helps to assure that adequate information security and privacy are 
provided. After the risk is transferred, for example to an insurance company, the 
incentive to maintain high levels of care is likely to markedly decrease.152 The draft 
law found in this article is designed to keep top management incentivized to 
provide funds and attention to achieve adequate levels of information security and 
privacy. Insurance, use of outsourcing firms, and other methods for information 
security and privacy related risk transfer can still be employed, if such a law were to 
be enacted, but these risk transfers would not then be serving to disincentivize top 
management because the accountability would still rest with the decision makers, 
the top managers. 
IX. WHY THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DEFENSE SHOULD BE SEVERELY LIMITED IN 
THIS AREA 
The assumption of risk defense to negligence and recklessness is predicated on 
having a level playing field, where both parties have information about the other, so 
as to be able to make a reasonably educated decision.153 This type of disclosure 
 
 149.  William S. Laufer, Corporiate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 1343 (1999). 
 150.  See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). This case is particularly 
noteworthy because the court said that the duty of care in takeover situations is higher (“enhanced”) than it 
usually is because there are moral hazards in those situations, and additional requirements will thus be 
required in order to ensure that top management acts in a manner that maintains the best interests of the 
shareholders. As discussed in this article, a heightened duty of care is now needed in information security and 
privacy matters, and the proposed law in the appendix to this article suggests one way to go about establishing 
that heightened duty of care. 
 151.  Empirical research shows that even though insurance companies ultimately pay the costs caused by 
negligent top management, when directors’ and officers’ insurance is in force, they do not effectively monitor 
top management corporate governance. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate 
Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795 (2007). Additionally, once 
litigation has begun, insurance companies do not manage litigation defense costs either. Id. These findings 
mean that insurance companies are not in a position to motivate top management to perform the necessary 
tasks to prevent harm to third parties. The findings also imply that the deterrent effects of shareholder 
derivative suits and regulatory actions are less than what is generally believed. 
 152.  See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541 (1979). 
 153.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 523(c) (AM. LAW INST., 1977) (stating that a plaintiff does 
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might prevail when two firms are going through a merger or acquisition, or some 
other very close type of engagement, perhaps a joint venture. But for the most part, 
even business partners are unaware of the information security and privacy at other 
firms with whom they do business. This is because maintaining confidentiality of 
the actual information security and privacy activities provides another level of 
security. Maintaining this level of confidentiality,154 even doling out information on 
a “need to know basis,” is considered standard business practice, even with business 
partners. 
Such information about information security and privacy at the organization in 
question is even less likely to be disclosed to a customer, taxpayer, donor, 
shareholder, or another person in a similar position, even if these parties have a 
demonstrable business relationship with the organization in question. Arguably, 
these third parties have a right to know how their personal information is being 
protected.  A prospective customer who is interacting with a business and is about 
to subscribe to or purchase a product or service will have even less information 
about the state of information security and privacy at the business.  Accordingly, 
such a person cannot reasonably assume the risk, because he does not know what 
the risk entails.  Therefore, the use of the acceptance of the risk defense in 
negligence and recklessness cases should be limited to those circumstances in 
which the plaintiff knew about the nature of the risks and voluntarily chose to 
accept those risks.155 The draft law in this article attempts to embody wording to 
that same effect. 
X. WHY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE SHOULD SIMILARLY BE SEVERELY 
RESTRICTED IN THIS AREA 
The distinction between assumption of the risk and contributory negligence is 
vague, but operationally a distinction can be drawn in that assumption of the risk is 
a voluntary choice made by the plaintiff and that choice is later used as an 
affirmative defense that would deny or restrict the liability of the defendant. On the 
other hand, contributory negligence involves some negligence or conduct, that an 
“ordinary man” would reasonably avoid, conduct committed by the plaintiff, and 
that negligent conduct is used as a method for reducing damages to be paid by the 
defendant, based on the observed relative misconduct of the parties to the 
lawsuit.156 
The common law defense involving contributory negligence revolves around 
the rule that there can be no recovery of damages for negligence if the injured 
person, by his own negligence, or by the negligence of another that is imputable to 
 
not assume the risk unless he knows of its existence). 
 154.  This approach is often called “security by obscurity,” and while it should not be the only type of 
security of information employed, it can be a useful adjunct to other deployed controls, when used in a 
“defense in depth” (multiple layers of controls) approach. For example, the U.S. military uses this approach 
by not publicly revealing the encryption algorithms that it employs for its current deployments. 
 155.  See Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985). In this case, the court found for the plaintiff 
in a product liability matter, and acceptance of the risk was not permitted as a defense because the plaintiff, 
who was injured due to the lack of a safety device, did not know that the device was missing. 
 156.  Mumma v. Reading Co., 247 F.Supp. 252, 257 (E.D. Pa. 1965). 
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the injured person, proximately caused the injury.  But in the context of an average 
third party who may be harmed by the information security and privacy choices 
made by top management, it is hard to understand how the third party could have 
sufficient information so as to be reasonably informed about the risks and avoid 
them. Again, for the reasons stated in the prior section’s discussion about 
assumption of the risk, if the organization’s information security and privacy 
activities remain unknown to the third party, and the third party cannot understand 
the risks, then there can be no rational use of the doctrine of contributory 
negligence. 
Negligence involves the notion that there has been some misconduct, but if a 
third party is compelled to be involved in a business process, in order to maintain 
his or her job for example, there can be no contributory negligence.157 This is 
because participation in a business process, to which the information security and 
privacy risks imposed by top management decisions apply, is not a choice made by 
the involved third party. If participation is forced as a requirement of a job, or in 
order to obtain a social service, or some business related product or service, the 
third party cannot be said to have chosen to engage in misconduct, because his or 
her participation was effectively forced. In the latter circumstances, use of the 
doctrine of contributory negligence should be denied by the presiding judge. Thus, 
the only permissible use of contributory negligence should be when the plaintiff 
voluntarily accepted the danger, and such a danger was clearly out of all proportion 
to the interest that he or she sought to advance through the choice to accept the 
danger.158 Where the situation was not clearly in proportion in the eyes of the 
plaintiff, then an assumption of the risk defense might still apply, as taken up in the 
prior section of this article. The draft law found at the end of this article attempts to 
embody these ideas. 
XI. HOW THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF LICENSE MUST LIKEWISE BE SEVERELY 
RESTRICTED IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES 
The affirmative defense of license provides that the defendant had permission 
from the plaintiff, to engage in the conduct that is set forth in a complaint.159 The 
defendant’s conduct, which the plaintiff believed to constitute a tort or some other 
unlawful conduct, is thus alleged to be permissible because it was contractually 
agreed-upon in advance. This defense is predicated on a pre-existing contractual 
agreement, and should at least in theory be permissible according to the freedom to 
contract doctrine,160 as supported by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Effectively, such a contractual agreement provides a promise 
 
 157.  See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F. 2d 479 (3d. Cir. 1965). 
 158.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (comparing 
unreasonable assumption of the risk with contributory negligence). 
 159.  Peter J. Shurn III, Potential Pitfalls of High-Tech Copyright Litigation, 25 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 513, 530 (2008). 
 160.  Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that freedom to contract was implicit 
in the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause), with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) 
(taking a much less activist role and permitting many more regulations). The latter pro-regulatory federal 
government attitude is assumed to continue and be conducive to passing and upholding the draft statute found 
in the appendix to this article. 
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not to sue the defendant.161 When the defendant’s conduct is outside the scope of 
the license provided,162 then an infringement of the plaintiff’s rights, or an 
actionable tort of some sort, may have occurred, and this affirmative defense would 
not apply. 
However, the license defense is predicated on an assumption that does not hold 
up in the real world, namely that a business, non-profit organization, or government 
agency offering a product or service that has the opportunity to purchase the best 
legal talent that money can buy is on an equal playing field with a consumer, who 
in all likelihood has not even read the terms of service (TOS), the legal contract, or 
the other agreement to which he or she must accede in order to obtain the sought-
after goods or services.  Further, the average consumer does not have access to the 
best legal talent available, nor does he or she have any preconceived notion that to 
engage such sophisticated legal talent– even if he or she was in a position to pay for 
it– would make a difference.  The situation bears much resemblance to an 
“adhesion contract.”  Thus, there is no bargaining possible in these situations and 
therefore there can be no “meeting of the minds.” Without a meeting of the minds 
on all material facts, however, there can be no contract.163 Therefore, license should 
not be recognized as an affirmative defense against information security and 
privacy related negligence or recklessness, unless the parties truly have both a 
meeting of the minds and a comparable level of power in the negotiations (more 
colloquially called a “level playing field”). 
One illustrative case revealing the inequities in this problematic area of the law 
and the new types of information to which rights and obligations have not yet been 
legally formalized is found in a case where medical researchers used cells from a 
patient’s body without his permission.164 The patient sued the researchers claiming 
conversion, alleging that they used his cells for lucrative research purposes that 
were not expressly agreed upon.  While the court did find insufficient disclosure on 
the part of the medical researchers, it denied legal recognition of a patient’s right to 
his own cells after they left his body and denied any recovery for conversion. 
This case is analogous to what is happening in the information security and 
privacy field, because in America today, new types of personal information and 
new uses for such information are being discovered and commercially exploited, 
largely without the consumer’s or data subject’s consent.  The lack of specific 
knowledge and ability to effectively negotiate, as manifest in adhesion contracts 
and other so-called licenses, should not permit commercial, governmental, or non-
profit interests to exploit the rights and information of others to the detriment of the 
individuals involved.  In the aforementioned case, it is notable that the court wrote 
that the plaintiff could not “state a case for conversion under existing law.” New 
laws, such as the draft law found in the appendix to this article, need to be enacted 
 
 161.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 162.  One case where this affirmative defense was used successfully involved a database and the 
taxonomy employed in that database. See Edgenet, Inc. v. Home Depot, 658 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2011). In that 
case, the database customer’s use of the taxonomy was permissible per the contract, even though the 
taxonomy was protected by copyright and customer no longer subscribed to the database service. 
 163.  Smith v. Neilan, 205 N.W.2d 186, 188 (1973) (denying specific performance under a contract 
because there was no meeting of the minds in the contract). 
 164.  See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
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so that plaintiffs are able to state their case under existing laws. 
XII. HOW THE COMMON LAWS OF NEGLIGENCE AND RECKLESSNESS SUPPORT A 
NECESSARY REBALANCING OF LIABILITY RELATED INCENTIVES 
A. Compliance-Related Fixed Law & Regulation Alone Cannot Be Effective 
The American information security and privacy approach, adopted by both 
private organizations, such as credit card companies, and government agencies, 
such as bank regulators, is focused primarily on compliance with laws and 
regulations. This approach can be mandated by government legislators or 
regulators, or by private-party contract.165 Without question, a great deal can be 
achieved with laws and regulations that specify what needs to be done, but too 
much faith is being placed in this compliance strategy.166 What is urgently needed 
is a shift of the focus to include greater organization-specific risk management.  By 
adopting laws that revitalize negligence and recklessness, as the proposed law in 
this article does, both the country and the organizations within it can achieve the 
desired shift to more risk management. 
The great emphasis on compliance has failed because it is unduly complex, 
burdensome, and fixed.  For instance, at the time that the Sony Pictures hack took 
place (the incident mentioned at the beginning of this article), the firm was in 
compliance with the PCI security standard.167 That notable achievement did not, 
however, prevent very serious damage.  By shifting the emphasis away from 
regulation and onto risk management, top management will be forced to take more 
of a holistic viewpoint that responds to the unique needs of their own organization, 
instead of the artificially imposed requirements dictated by some legislator or 
regulator at a considerable time in the past. 
The compliance model for dealing with information security and privacy labors 
under the false assumption that this exceedingly complex field can be properly 
addressed through a one-size-fits-all solution.  That’s like trying to get a square peg 
to fit in a round hole, or actually a hole that is very much more complex than 
simply round.  Only top management knows exactly what an organization’s true 
information security and privacy requirements are from a risk management 
perspective, and they should thus be held accountable to make sure that the controls 
that are installed and operated are, in fact, those dictated by the organization’s 
unique needs, not just those imposed by compliance related laws and regulations.168 
 
 165.  For example, merchants accepting credit cards must comply with the Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standard, also known as being “PCI Compliant.” If a firm wishes to accept, process, store or transmit 
credit card data, it must sign a contract that includes compliance with this standard as well as regular audits. 
 166.  There is evidence of an increasing appreciation inside the information security and privacy 
community, that compliance alone is not sufficient, and so a second line of defense is needed, which can be 
provided by risk management. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a U.S. 
bank regulator, has issued guidance urging banks to adopt risk management processes. See Third-Party 
Relationships: Risk Management Guidance, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY: OCC BULLETIN 2013-
29 (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2013/bulletin-2013-29.html. 
 167.  See PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, PCI DSS QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE: UNDERSTANDING 
THE PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY DATA SECURITY STANDARD VERSION 2.0 (2010). 
 168.  See David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 287 (2014). 
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It is presumptuous for legislators, regulators, or third parties of any type to assume 
that they know what organizations must have in order to be secure.  Thus the 
compliance-related approach, if relied upon completely, cannot help but be 
deficient, and the predictable result will be serious compromises of security and 
privacy. 
Unless primary reliance on compliance is significantly changed, as this article 
suggests, and as long as the information security and privacy problems get 
worse169—which they have progressively done for the last several decades—
progressively greater emphasis will be placed on compliance, and the costs and 
burdens on management’s time imposed by compliance requirements will get 
progressively greater for organizations. Much of this cost and time required for 
compliance is wasted because the burdens imposed by the laws and regulations are 
inapplicable to the organizations in question. Still more frustrating is the fact that 
these wasted resources could have alternatively been devoted to the true 
information security and privacy needs of the organization. This would have been 
the case if an emphasis on risk management had been adopted, as in keeping with 
the proposed law at the end of this article. 
The compliance approach should not be entirely abandoned, because significant 
improvements to information security and privacy has resulted from compliance-
related efforts. But the approach to compliance is going to become more granular, 
for example industry specific, rather than the coarse general approach that has been 
ill fitting to the needs of many organizations. Rather than dictating specific control 
measures, technologies, or procedures, more emphasis must be placed on general 
methodologies, policies, and goals. The work of the Federal Trade Commission is 
exemplary in this respect because it has, for example, been using the goal of 
stopping “unfair and deceptive acts and practices” as a way to achieve many 
positive information security and privacy goals.170 Its work has helped a great deal 
to make sure that the public representations of organizations, for example in web-
posted privacy policies, are consistent with the ways the involved personal 
information is being protected by the organization in question. 
While some proponents of the compliance-related approach to solving the 
information security problem are taking a very dictatorial approach171 to what 
management must do and how they must do it, such an approach is incompatible 
with the free market system and the basic economic axiom that the free market 
should be able to determine how best to meet consumer needs.  Accordingly, the 
law proposed herein specifies only the basic needs, it does not specify how 
management has to meet those needs. Management in each organization will know 
 
 169.  Organizations are now seeing a proliferation of compliance-related laws and regulations at both the 
state and the federal levels. For example, consider the laws regarding reporting security and privacy breaches, 
which are a mess of confusing requirements coming from many different jurisdictions. See NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS (2016), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-
laws.aspx. In the overall information security and privacy area, a unified federally-dictated approach is 
urgently needed, and it is the law proposed by this article that points in the direction where the nation must go 
in order to rationalize, clarify, and simplify these laws and regulations. 
 170.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 171.  See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003). 
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best how to meet those needs, rather than government actors taking the role of a 
parent supervising a child’s every move.  There are some basic needs which must 
be met, such as taking care of the security and privacy needs of third parties, which 
can be handled with a negligence and recklessness-related duty of care, and those 
basic requirements are set forth in the proposed law found in this article, but 
legislation and regulation of this nature should not be very detailed lest it become 
counterproductive.  In that respect, this author is advocating for the performance-
based approach to compliance so that only the final desired state is mandated by 
laws and regulations. 
Another reason why the emphasis on the compliance approach to information 
security and privacy is not advisable is that it can encourage a regulatory “race to 
the bottom” between states.172 Although it is not yet a notable problem, except 
perhaps in the breach notification area, this intention by states to attract or retain 
economic activity by liberalizing laws and regulations is not a good thing for 
information security and privacy.  Such an approach would encourage states to 
specify only the bare-bones requirements so that they can attract businesses to their 
state, in effect, placing revenue generation above the public welfare.173 The 
problem with state competition based on regulatory or legal minimization is that the 
Internet has globalized markets, and the balkanization of information security and 
privacy regulation only results in undue burdens and unnecessary costs for the 
organizations required to comply with these laws and regulations specified by many 
different jurisdictions. Ultimately, we will need a worldwide approach to such 
matters, but a proper step to take at this point in time is to have unifying and 
consistent federal legislation to standardize the laws and regulations within the 
United States.174 
B. Demonstrated Dynamic Adjustment Inherent in Common Law 
The common law related to negligence and recklessness does not presuppose 
that people will always be protected.  Likewise, it is realistic to believe that 
information security and privacy systems will, from time to time, be compromised 
or otherwise become dysfunctional.  Therefore, rather than demanding perfection, 
the law related to negligence and recklessness establishes a duty of care and 
determines whether a reasonable person would have acted as the defendant acted 
under the same circumstances.  This is an extremely adaptive model, and can be 
readily applied to an infinite variety of circumstances that might be presented to the 
court in either a civil or criminal action.  This negligence and recklessness model 
 
 172.  Delaware is one the best known states engaging in race to the bottom induced by state-versus-state 
competition. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003). 
 173.  John R. Forbush, Comment, Regulating the Use and Sharing of Energy Consumption Data: 
Assessing California’s SB 1476 Smart Meter Privacy Statute, 75 ALB. L. REV. 341 (2011-2012). 
 174.  See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International 
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 5-8 (2000). Of note is the 
manner in which the leadership of the European Union has enacted considerably stronger privacy laws and 
has thereby increased national standards since nations are blocked from doing business with the EU unless 
those standards are met. The U.S. federal government could do something similar to international standards of 
information security and privacy with a new negligence and recklessness law, such as the one found at the end 
of this article. 
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thus provides a legal model that is capable of dealing with unreasonably harmful 
conduct that is at this time and in the near future unknown.175 The compliance-
related regulatory and legal model mentioned above cannot deal with unknown 
future developments, although it is nonetheless a positive way to mandate those 
requirements that have been shown to be consistently beneficial, such as automobile 
seat belts. Again, here we see the need for a hybrid model going forward, a model 
involving both negligence and recklessness through risk assessment on one hand, 
and regulatory oversight plus contractual auditing176 through compliance 
assessment on the other hand. 
Perhaps the most compelling reason to rely more so on negligence and 
recklessness law than Americans do now is that the law evolves slowly, while 
information systems technology, in comparison, evolves rapidly. We now have a 
large divergence in the degree to which these two domains reflect the reality of 
today’s contemporary society.177 This divergence is becoming wider and 
increasingly problematic and appears to be a harbinger of increasingly costly and 
painful information security and privacy problems. Assuming that the law will not 
be able to catch or keep up with the pace of change in the information technology 
field, there must be a relinquishment of the faith in the current legal approach that 
places its primary reliance on laws and regulations that involve compliance, as 
described above. Instead, there should be greater emphasis on the development of a 
legal and regulatory process for handling information security and privacy that uses 
evidence-based feedback to determine what works and what does not (this feedback 
is, in turn, manifest in an industry specific standard of due care). Such an evidence-
based process approach can be achieved through considerably greater reliance on 
the common law negligence and recklessness approach, as recommended by this 
article. 
Still another argument for the dynamic nature of the negligence and 
recklessness-based model described in this article has to do with realistic modesty. 
Although many people are well-meaning and do have innovative proposals to 
improve information security and privacy through some new process or invention, 
history has shown that the vast majority of these proposals are soon obsolete, if not 
dysfunctional or forgotten. Accordingly, we should not empower these people to 
enact laws and regulations that mandate their own solutions—be they some new 
process for evaluating security and privacy or some new technology that 
supposedly will be a panacea. Instead, we should allow the marketplace of ideas to 
allow the most useful approaches to improving information security and privacy to 
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prevail, without undue constraints. This approach, which in fact, is in keeping with 
“creative destruction”178 capitalistic economic theory, can be supported by the 
increased reliance on the negligence and recklessness model advocated in this 
article. 
XIII. CONCLUSION 
The United States now has several decades of historical experience in the 
information security and privacy field, and that period’s shockingly damaging 
experience clearly shows that Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” of the marketplace is 
not adequately evolving the marketplace fast enough, or substantially enough, to 
successfully respond to the information security and privacy problems that plague 
the nation. Likewise, there is ample evidence that current top management incentive 
systems are not causing top managers to make the best decisions in this critical 
area. On the contrary, existing incentive systems such as quarterly bonuses, short-
term stock options, and frequent inter-organizational job changes, encourage both 
underinvestment and inaction in the information security and privacy area. Such 
underinvestment and inaction can be traced directly to the decisions made by top 
management. These are the very people who are most influential in, and also who 
must be actively involved in, the resolution of this problem in order for it to be 
successfully solved. We must establish a new set of incentives that cause top 
management to act in ways that result in prudent, effective levels of information 
security and privacy. 
Information security and privacy problems have reached a state of widespread 
crisis and emergency, and Congressional lawmaking intervention to establish a 
consistent nationwide federal solution is essential. But since much is at stake, 
considerable concern about unintended consequences and unexpected outcomes is 
warranted when undertaking any legal and regulatory intervention. This article 
proposes a politically palatable, and exceedingly conservative, minimal-level of 
intervention associated with a rebalancing of top management incentives and 
personal liability. The proposed way forward may be characterized as a reversion to 
a legal model where there was much greater reliance on the laws of negligence and 
recklessness than is currently seen in the American legal system. The ways in which 
the laws of negligence and reckless will be applied to information security and 
privacy issues must be clarified and adjusted. For example, modern defenses to 
negligence and recklessness—like the business judgment rule and the assumption 
of risk—need to be scaled back so that top management is strongly incentivized to 
look after the interests of third parties such as employees, customers, business 
partners, and members of the general public, not just the interests of shareholders 
and related constituencies. Detailing the way forward, this article has focused on 
risk management, and its suggested approach compliments, rather than replaces, 
existing compliance-related approaches to improving information security and 
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privacy. 
We now have the benefit of history to clearly understand cause and effect, what 
might happen, what is at stake, and what must be done. From a legal standpoint, 
that is sufficient to establish a standard of due care, what constitutes a breach of that 
standard, and whether the damage in question could have been foreseen. Thus, the 
existence of negligence and recklessness can now readily be determined by a court 
of law. A change in the law related to incentive systems for top management, a 
change that incorporates new definitions of negligence and recklessness, would go a 
long way to solving the information security and privacy problems with which 
America now wrestles. A Congressional research committee should be promptly 
established to investigate how a new national law similar to the one set forth in the 
appendix to this article might help restore faith, confidence, and trust in the 
information systems technological infrastructure, on which so much of modern 
American life is dependent. Congressional hearings to discuss such a law, or a 
conference of experts to discuss the merits of such a law, may also be appropriate 
next steps. 
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APPENDIX 1. DRAFT FEDERAL STATUTE: 
Information Security and Privacy Top Management Negligence and 
Recklessness Act (the “Stewards of the Public Trust Act”) 
Legislative Intent: Information systems and related information networks have 
become pervasive and critical components of modern American society, 
components on which many different types of stakeholders now depend. National 
security, national competitiveness, and national welfare all now critically depend on 
effective and reasonable information security and privacy control measures. In 
response to these new conditions, a new top management stewardship responsibility 
toward the stakeholders other than shareholders has emerged. Acknowledging that 
there is a need for the legal recognition of this important position of stewardship, 
this Act recognizes both a criminal and a civil form of liability related to 
information security or privacy. These offenses occur when top managers fail to 
establish effective and reasonable control measures that protect information systems 
and/or information networks, in a manner consistent with the standard of due care 
for their particular industry. 
Supersedes Existing Authorities: This Act applies to all organizations that 
come within the jurisdiction of federal courts, and according to the U.S. 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause, this Act unifies all related legislation in all 
federal jurisdictions of the United States into this single statute. This Act, and all 
revisions subsequently passed by Congress and duly signed into law, supersedes all 
other statutes that directly address the subject matter of this Act. Thus, all state, 
city, county, or other government statutes, in addition to corporate charters, 
corporate articles, certificates of incorporation, corporate by-laws, not-for-profit 
organizing documents, trust creation documents, corporate contractual agreements 
with top management, insurance contracts, and related legal documents which 
either free and/or indemnify top management from personal liability, and/or limit 
top management personal liability exposure, for a breach of the duty of care, as 
discussed in this statue, are insofar as they conflict with any provision in this Act, 
henceforth both void and unenforceable on all the matters discussed in this Act. 
Similarly, nothing in directors’ and officers’ insurance policies, employment 
contracts, corporate charters, or similar legal documents, as mentioned in the prior 
paragraph, shall prevent the assets of the organization in question from being used 
under the doctrine of vicarious liability or respondeat superior, to satisfy an adverse 
judgment rendered against one or more top managers under this Act. But such 
vicarious liability or respondeat superior responsibility applies only when the 
personal assets of the top managers judged to be liable have first been depleted in 
satisfaction of a judgment under this Act. 
Offenses: Whoever, when acting in the capacity of a top manager in charge 
approving the budget that allocates resources for information security and/or 
information privacy, materially fails to establish effective and reasonable control 
measures that are consistent with the standard of due care employed by other 
organizations in the same industry, and such failure directly and proximately leads 
to a loss as defined in this Act, shall be guilty of or liable for either negligence or 
recklessness in the management of information security and/or privacy. A civil right 
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of action is hereby expressly recognized, as is a crime, and the latter is recognized 
as a felony. Civil rights of action may be brought under this Act as an individual 
plaintiff, as a joined group of plaintiffs, as a class action, and/or as a shareholder 
derivative suit involving one or more of the shareholders in the involved 
organization. 
Duty of Care: Top manager defendants owe a duty of care, from both a 
negligence standpoint and a recklessness standpoint, to all third parties with whom 
they have an existing relationship, whether that relationship has been established by 
formal business contract or business-related circumstantial events. These third 
parties include, but are not limited to, business sales prospects, health care patients, 
product-purchasing customers, business partners, outsourcing firm staff, 
contractors, consultants, employees, persons described in a database maintained by 
top management’s organization, and co-defendants in a lawsuit. 
The duty owed to these third parties includes, but is not limited to, maintaining 
personally identifiable information provided by the third parties, and received by 
the organization that top management supervises, so that the information is kept in 
a secure and private manner, as is consistent with the prevailing standard of due 
care in the industry in question, or the equivalent standard of due care in 
government agencies or non-profit organizations. The nature of, and the limits 
related to, this same prevailing standard of due care, applicable to the industry 
involved, shall in all cases be established by testimony, written evidence, video 
statements offered, and the like issued by experts working in the field of 
information security and/or privacy. 
Although not limited to the following four objectives, this duty requires top 
management to ensure that information provided by third parties is reasonably 
protected from (1) unauthorized usage, (2) unauthorized disclosure, (3) 
unauthorized modification, and (4) unavailability—any of which would cause 
material and serious harm to any of these third parties. This duty includes the 
requirement to reasonably notify third parties when information about them has 
been compromised in a manner that is likely to cause a material loss, if the third 
parties can reasonably do something in response to the notification to protect 
themselves. The duty also includes the requirement to correct materially incorrect 
information disseminated to these third parties about the status of information 
security and/or privacy at the organization that the top manager oversees. 
Furthermore, this duty requires that third parties be allowed to terminate their 
relationship with the organization that the top manager supervises without an 
unreasonably burdensome information security and/or privacy related penalty being 
imposed. 
This duty to third parties furthermore includes maintaining the organization’s 
own information systems, and assets (assets that are intellectual, informational, and/
or physical in nature) controlled by these information systems, so that steps are 
taken to reasonably protect third parties from physical, financial, reputational, and/
or informational harm. Where top management is the only party that can reasonably 
take such steps, or initiate such steps, so as to provide additional information 
security and/or privacy, this duty of care accrues, thereby requiring that top 
management take such steps if these steps are both reasonable and consistent with 
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the standard of due care industry practices mentioned above. 
Negligence Per Se: No intention to cause harm, malice, or mens rea 
requirement is necessary in order to show a breach of the duty of due care in the 
area of information security and/or privacy. Plaintiffs need only show that the top 
manager defendant failed to engage an independent expert third party, who is free 
from material conflicts of interest on at least an annual basis, to review the 
information security and privacy status of a majority of the organization’s units and 
prepare a detailed report of recommended improvements. That fact alone will 
establish negligence per se. 
Standing: To establish standing to prosecute or sue, third party plaintiffs must 
have suffered demonstrable direct damages that in aggregate value total at least 
$75,000 (or must demonstrably be in imminent danger of suffering such harm when 
an injunction is involved). This threshold may be met by damages suffered by a 
specific plaintiff, a class of plaintiffs, or a successor in interest to either a specific 
plaintiff or a class of plaintiffs. In addition, to establish standing, these damages 
must have been actually and proximately caused by the top manager’s failure to 
establish and maintain effective and reasonable control measures consistent with 
those used by other firms in the same industry as the organization in question. 
Damages: To prove damages when there have been no monetary transactions 
to demonstrate the extent of those same damages, for example with privacy 
violations, courts shall, under this law, be authorized to establish damages as the 
cost to reestablish the status quo before the harm in question took place. The tort 
law doctrine known as the “economic loss rule” thus does not apply to this 
particular Act; in other words there does not need to be physical property damage or 
personal injury damage in order for damages to be recoverable under this Act. 
Penalties: 
(a) Criminal - The crime of negligent information security or privacy 
management is a Class A felony for which punishment, both imprisonment and 
fines, will be defined by federal sentencing guidelines. The court hearing a case 
involving negligent information security or privacy management may use its 
discretion to impose fines exceeding those found in the federal sentencing 
guidelines, up to a total of $100,000,000 per defendant, as equity may require. 
The crime of negligent information security or privacy management is a strict 
liability offense, and no foreseeability is required to prove guilt under this Act. 
Guilt is established by an top manager’s misfeasance, nonfeasance, failure to act, or 
willful blindness, such that a materially deficient information security or privacy 
control measures, i.e., control measures that diverged materially from an industry 
related standard of due care, prevailed at the time that the harms in question took 
place, and but for that state of control measures, the harms to person or property 
would not have taken place. 
(b) Civil - A federal private right of action under the theory of negligence per 
se is expressly authorized hereby. Such a private right of action can impose direct 
personal liability on the involved top manager, regardless of whether the top 
manager was at the time acting in the capacity of an agent for the organization in 
question, if it can be shown that such a top manager made the budgetary decisions 
related to the information security and privacy control measures that prevailed at 
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the time of the plaintiff’s loss. An information security and privacy management 
related duty of care is expressly established for top managers by this Act. A breach 
of that duty may be demonstrated by a failure to establish and maintain effective 
and reasonable information security or privacy control measures, such that the 
measures in existence materially diverged from the industry specific standard of 
due care. Actual cause may be established where the harm to person or property 
would not have been sustained, but for the failure of the top manager to establish 
and maintain effective and reasonable information security or privacy control 
measures consistent with an industry specific standard of due care. 
Proximate cause for such an offense can be proven without a showing of the 
foreseeability of the specific risk that caused the harm in question. Thus the 
“extraordinary in hindsight” doctrine may be used to establish all manner of 
possible consequences that occurred because the top manager had materially failed 
to provide effective and reasonable information security or privacy. To establish 
dependent cause, it is sufficient to show that the risk of harm was materially 
enhanced by the top manager’s failure to establish effective and reasonable 
information security or privacy control measures, consistent with the industry 
related standard of due care. Intervening dependent causes, such as a system 
attacker’s actions, will not be considered a separate cause that diminishes the extent 
of the top manager’s negligence under this Act. 
(c) Punitive Damages - Treble compensatory damages (punitive damages) are 
authorized in those cases under this Act where the plaintiff makes a successful 
showing that the involved top manager was willful in his or her inattention to 
information security and/or privacy. Such willful intent may be established by any 
method that the court deems proper, but it will clearly be demonstrated by multiple 
unaddressed but serious reported incidents of information security or privacy losses 
taking place over the course of at least two months, or by the top manager’s 
knowing refusal to allocate sufficient resources to improve information security 
and/or privacy so as to become compliant with minimum industry-related standard 
of due care. Thus, intention to harm specific people or property can be 
demonstrated by transferred intent. So where the defendant is shown to have been 
willful in his or her inattention to information security or privacy matters, that will 
be sufficient to show intent to harm others or their property. 
Remedies: In addition to criminal fines, imprisonment, civil compensatory 
damages, and civil punitive damages, injunctions may issue upon the showing of 
sufficient cause. At the discretion of the court, attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, 
court costs, and other actual and reasonable costs may be awarded to either the 
prosecuting government agency obtaining a conviction or the prevailing plaintiff. 
Defenses: No scienter requirement is necessary for either a criminal conviction 
or civil liability with negligent information security or privacy management. Mere 
negligence is sufficient, and judgment does not depend on the level of knowledge 
that the top manager possessed. It is sufficient that such a top manager failed to 
exercise a duty of care that a reasonably prudent manager in the same industry 
would have employed, so as to provide effective and reasonable information 
security and privacy control measures consistent with industry standards of due 
care. 
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Both vicarious liability and respondeat superior are not recognized defenses to 
negligent information security or privacy management under this Act. While a top 
manager defendant is an agent of the organization for which he or she works, 
because a violation of a law would be a violation of an agent’s duty of loyalty, the 
violation of this Act is deemed a personal frolic, and cannot be considered to be 
either within the scope of employment, or a detour from the scope of employment. 
Statements in articles of incorporation, certificates of incorporation, by-laws, or 
similar official documents adopted by the corporation, as such a “corporation” is 
defined in this Act, shall not limit or eliminate the personal liability established by 
this Act. Nonetheless, directors and officers insurance, or other types of insurance, 
may be arranged by and paid for by the involved corporation to help pay the 
damages and other costs for which top managers are held personally liable under 
this Act. Nonetheless, if an action under this Act establishes that the defendant top 
manager knowingly chose to maintain ineffective and/or unreasonable control 
measures, that fact alone would be a breach of the duty of good faith, which 
includes the duty to observe and uphold laws such as this, and therefore the 
involved top manager would not be protected via such indemnification. 
Safe Harbor: Top managers can fully and effectively defend and immunize 
themselves against all negligence and recklessness charges, both criminal and civil, 
as defined under this Act, by making a convincing showing to the court of all of the 
following three essential conditions: (1) the organization has adopted, and diligently 
employed, for over a year prior to the time when the damages in question were 
sustained, a formal documented risk management system to bring information 
security and privacy problems to top management’s attention, to diligently manage 
progress on projects in this same area, and to reveal the current organizational state 
of information security and privacy, (2) the organization has routinely employed 
independent third party professional experts in the domain of information security 
and privacy, to make organization-wide assessments, of all material risks and 
related control measures, on at least an annual basis, for all of the past three years, 
and (3) the top manager defendant has not been placed on notice, about any 
material deficiencies in the information security and privacy area, by such a 
professional expert over the prior twelve-month period leading up to the time when 
the damages in question were sustained. 
Another way that such safe harbor may be obtained is via a due diligence 
defense. In order to successfully plead such a defense, the defendant must make a 
convincing showing of all three of the following conditions: (1) the organization 
has adopted, and diligently employed, for over a year prior to the time when the 
damages in question were sustained, a formal documented risk management system 
to bring information security and privacy problems to top management’s attention, 
to manage projects in this same area, and to reveal the current organizational state 
of information security and privacy, (2) the organization has routinely employed 
independent third party professional experts in the domain of information security 
and privacy, to make organization-wide assessments, of all material risks and 
related control measures, on at least an annual basis, for all of the past three years, 
and (3) even though the top manager has been placed on notice of one or more 
material deficiencies by such a professional expert, a credible and reasonable 
process of expedited remediation addressing these deficiencies can be demonstrated 
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by specific management acts, specific documents issued, changes in information 
systems, or other convincing dated evidence, and such a remediation process was 
both established and operational for at least six months prior to the time that the 
loss in question took place. 
Potential Defendants: As used in this Act, the term “top manager” includes all 
executive managers in traditional corporations and also in new entity types such as 
limited liability corporations and limited liability partnerships. It additionally 
includes top managers at traditional partnerships, non-profit organizations, 
charities, non-governmental-organizations, foundations, and government agencies 
at all levels of government. Defendant top managers subject to liability via this Act 
are only those managers who are personally responsible for approving the 
information security and privacy budget. Those top managers who are potential 
defendants under this Act may have a wide variety of titles such as Chief Executive 
Officer, Chief Information Officer, or Chief Operations Officer, and their 
obligations under this Act stem entirely from their formally-designated duties 
related to budget approval. These same obligations are not determined by job title, 
nor are they determined by status as a legal officer of the organization. 
Exempt Organizations: This Act does not apply to top managers at 
organizations that have never reached either $10,000,000 or more in either sales or 
donations, or 10,000 or more customers or users. Managers at organizations that do 
not meet either of those two thresholds are exempt from all provisions of this Act. 
All top managers as described in this Act who are working in government agencies 
are subject to this Act, and to them, the thresholds in this paragraph do not apply. 
Business Judgment Rule Defense: The business judgment rule defense shall 
not apply to matters addressed in this Act unless the defendant can clearly and 
convincingly demonstrate to the court all of the following: (1) one or more 
independent third party experts in the field of information security and privacy were 
retained by plaintiff’s organization at least one year before the date of the first event 
in the complaint filed by plaintiff or prosecutor, (2) the findings in the report issued 
by such a third party expert were diligently investigated, pursued, analyzed and 
employed to improve information security and privacy at the organization in 
question, for a period of at least one year prior to the first of the events on which the 
plaintiff or prosecutor is basing a claim, (3) after revealing the mechanism of action 
for all incentive systems applicable to the defendant at the time of the events 
described in that complaint, no material conflicts of interest existed, that would be 
likely to cause the defendant to act in a way that would be contrary to maintaining 
and supporting an adequate level of information security and privacy at the 
organization in question (as defined by standard industry practices), and (4) the 
information security and privacy measures in question demonstrably met or 
exceeded the industry related standard of due care for the organization in question. 
Affirmative Defense of License: For purposes of determining negligence or 
recklessness under this Act, the affirmative defense of license, alleging that the 
defendant had contractual agreement with the plaintiff, or with the plaintiff’s 
organization, allowing the conduct described in the plaintiff’s complaint, can be 
recognized by the court only if all of the following four conditions apply. To 
employ this defense defendant must show that: (1) there was a valid existing 
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contract between the plaintiff and the organization that employed the defendant, (2) 
the plaintiff was aware, in all material respects, of the information security and 
privacy risks associated with entering into such a contract, (3) the contract was not 
one of adhesion, in other words there was a genuine “meeting of the minds” 
between the plaintiff and a representative of the organization that employs the 
defendant, and each such party was represented by counsel at the time that the 
contract was negotiated, and (4) such a contract does not expressly address, restrict, 
or limit the negligence or recklessness of the defendant, only that of the 
organization for which the defendant works. 
Affirmative Defense of Assumption of the Risk: For purposes of determining 
negligence or recklessness under this Act, defendants will only be able to employ 
the assumption of risk defense if they can show that: (1) the plaintiff had a 
reasonable level of actual knowledge of relevant risks, that would enable plaintiff to 
make a reasonably informed decision, (2) plaintiff expressly and voluntarily agreed 
to assume the risk after obtaining such knowledge, and (3) the loss in question took 
place subsequent to the time that the plaintiff allegedly assumed the risk. 
Waivers and Releases: Contractual waivers of rights, liability releases, and 
other agreements dealing with limitations on the right to sue under this law, the 
allocation of liability under this law, and/or the mandated arbitration of claims 
under this law, shall be void and unenforceable unless defendant can show that: (1) 
plaintiff had a reasonable level of actual knowledge about the relevant information 
security and privacy risks, and (2) comprehensible information about these risks 
had been provided to plaintiff before such a waiver, release, or other agreement was 
entered into by plaintiff. General disclosures found in contracts of adhesion, non-
negotiable standard form contracts, legal disclosure forms, or Internet-based terms 
of service screens, do not suffice when it comes to providing the plaintiff with a 
reasonable level of actual knowledge so that the assumption of risk defense may be 
successfully claimed by the defendant. To employ this defense successfully, a 
defendant’s disclosure of information about relevant risks must have been at a level 
of detail so that the plaintiff can reasonably understand both the nature of adverse 
future consequences associated with entering into an agreement regarding the 
assumption of risk, and the potential magnitude of such future consequences. 
Contributory Negligence Defense: Contributory negligence and contributory 
fault, will not be recognized as a defense under this Act if the plaintiff was not 
actually and reasonably aware of the relevant risks involved at the time that the 
harm was suffered and so could not adequately guard against the possibility of 
adverse consequences resulting from assuming those risks. If, however, the plaintiff 
used a product or service, offered by an organization managed by the defendant, 
and that usage was in clear and explicit opposition to its ordinarily offered usage, or 
in opposition to clear and explicit instructions provided by the defendant’s 
organization, then contributory negligence may successfully be employed as a 
defense. The use of the contributory negligence defense, as it relates to this Act, 
shall furthermore be restricted so that it can only be employed to the extent that 
plaintiff clearly and negligently assumed the risk out of all proportion to the interest 
to be obtained thereby. 
Self-Executing: Upon passage by the Congress and the subsequent signing into 
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law by the President or by Congress’s action to override the President’s veto, this 
law shall be immediately effective and without need for any implementing action. 
No regulations need to be written, and no other governing body needs to adopt or 
approve this law in order for it to go into effect. 
 
APPENDIX 2. KEY PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED NEW LAW CREATING A 
SOCIALLY-BENEFICIAL TOP MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE SYSTEM RELATED TO 
INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY: 
 (1) Require that organizations meet a minimum industry-based standard of 
due care related to information security and privacy in order for top management to 
be protected from personal liability related to negligence or recklessness, either 
civil or criminal in nature, in those cases where serious harm can be shown to have 
been caused to third parties, 
(2) Eliminate the need to show intention to cause harm, malice, mens rea, and 
the like, in that negligence and/or recklessness can be clearly established in a 
straightforward fashion, via the per se doctrine, simply because an organization 
materially failed to meet an industry-related standard of due care in the information 
security and privacy area (and such a standard can be established by existing 
regulations and/or laws such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act), 
(3) Create a straight forward and clearly delineated “safe harbor” process, 
involving the use of external expert consultants in the information security and 
privacy field (acting much like Certified Public Accountants in the Financial 
Reporting Act), which will be used to independently determine whether a firm has 
met the minimum standard of due care in a particular industry, 
(4) Scale back the applicability of the business judgment rule that often 
inappropriately protects top management from being incentivized by negligence or 
recklessness lawsuits in information security and privacy harm to third party cases 
because the assumptions on which this rule is based are not relevant in the 
information security and privacy area, 
(5) Strongly limit the use of additional defenses, such as acceptance of the risk 
defenses that may otherwise limit top management personal liability in information 
security and privacy cases so that these defenses more accurately reflect modern 
real-world conditions, including the fact that top managers are now often stewards 
of the public trust, 
(6) Replace corporate charters, bylaws, executive employment contracts, 
waivers, releases, and other legal agreements that limit top management personal 
liability in the information security and privacy area with this new national law so 
that top management will always have a widely-understood standardized level of 
exposure to negligence and recklessness related personal liability, thus motivating 
adequate funding for, and attention to, both information security and privacy, and 
(7) Permit indemnification to pay for information security and privacy harms 
suffered by third parties if such harms were caused by the negligence or 
recklessness of top management, but to maintain a truly effective incentive system, 
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allow such indemnification to be employed only after all the personal assets of 
liable top manager(s) have first been used to satisfy all judgments rendered under 
this statute. 
 
 
